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11 Introduction
Experiments, in which subjects play relatively simple ﬁnite normal form or extensive form games,
often focus on testing what one might call economic theory. Economic theory in such cases can
be said to be the combination of game theory and, importantly, the assumed (monotonic) one-
to-one link between utility and material pay-oﬀs. Often the reaction to ﬁnding violations of this
economic theory is the introduction of preferences which not only depend on a player’s material
payoﬀ but also perhaps other players’ material payoﬀs or even utilities. Often maintaining that
players (who are assumed, in contrast to us researchers, to know their co-players’ preferences)
would play some highly sophisticated notion of equilibrium (a prediction of game theory), such
as subgame perfection or sequential equilibrium for extensive form games or an undominated
equilibrium in normal form games.
Few experimental papers endeavor to test the predictions of game theory on their own.
However, what are the predictions of game theory really? One prediction is that play will be
in Nash equilibrium, but sometimes we even reﬁne that to Selten (1965)’s subgame perfect
equilibrium or even Kreps and Wilson (1982)’s sequential equilibrium in extensive form games
and undominated or Selten (1975)’s trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in both normal and
extensive form games. But does game theory really predict even Nash equilibrium behavior?
Justifying Nash equilibrium behavior or any of its reﬁnement is very hard. In a truly one-shot
game even if we assume that players are rational and have common knowledge of rationality we
can only really expect players to play some strategy within the set of rationalizable strategies,
see Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). To then justify equilibrium behavior we would have
to argue that players’ beliefs are somehow aligned. In a truly one-shot game, however, there is
no reason to believe that this would be the case. That is why, for instance, the coordination
game is such an interesting game, precisely because we often see that players are not able to
coordinate on a Nash equilibrium if the game is only played once.
We only have hope of further pinning down what players might be doing in a game, beyond
that they might play a rationalizable strategy, if the game is played repeatedly by various people,
so that learning (or evolution) can take place. Models of learning were developed virtually at the
same time as Nash proposed his solution concept. Even Nash had an evolutionary interpretation
of his solution concept in mind (for the appropriate quote from Nash’s PhD thesis see page 1
in Ritzberger and Weibull (1995)). These models, however, principally failed to provide a
justiﬁcation for equilibrium behavior.
There are then two main avenues of research. One is to ﬁnd processes which do lead to
equilibrium behavior in some sense, and then question the reasonability or plausibility of these
processes after the fact. Alternatively one could just accept that equilibrium behavior can not
be so easily justiﬁed and ask the question what can be justiﬁed instead. The two most striking
results in the second type of literature are due to Hurkens (1995) and Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995). In a stochastic best-reply model a la Young (1993) Hurkens (1995) shows that the only
candidates for stochastically stable states are those within Basu and Weibull’s (1991) CURB
sets. Using results of Balkenborg (1992), Hurkens (1995) furthermore shows that a specially
reﬁned stochastic best-reply dynamics leads to play eventually being within Kalai and Samet’s
(1984) persistent retracts. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) show that under any general payoﬀ-
positive dynamics minimal asymptotically stable faces are spanned by pure strategy sets which
are closed under weakly better replies. Now these sets can be very large.
In this paper we are after the following. What is the smallest possible set of states one could
2still call asymptotically stable under some plausible dynamic? In order to ﬁnd an answer to
this question we restrict attention to best-reply dynamics as opposed to better-reply dynamics.
This is, of course, a strong assumption about the rationality of individuals. We then go further
in asking whether we could reasonably restrict players to play only a subset of best-replies.
We, in fact, study reﬁnements of the best-reply correspondence which satisfy 5 conditions.
A reﬁnement must be a subset of the best-reply correspondence, be never empty valued, be
convex-valued, have a product structure, and be upper hemi-continuous. Under certain mild
conditions on the normal form game at hand there is a unique minimal such reﬁned corre-
spondence, which we characterize. This is in some sense the opposite exercise undertaken by
Ritzberger and Weibull (1995). They ﬁnd sets which are asymptotically stable under a wide
variety of deterministic dynamics, while we here investigate sets which are asymptotically stable
under only the, in a well-speciﬁed sense, most selective of deterministic dynamics. In this sense,
we characterize the smallest faces which one could justiﬁably call evolutionarily stable. The
main result of this paper is that these smallest evolutionarily stable faces coincide with Kalai
and Samet’s (1984) persistent retracts, which again coincide with Basu and Weibull’s (1991)
CURB sets adapted for the minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence (Theorems 2, 5, and 6).
This result is analogous to Hurkens’s (1995) result that persistent retracts are the only candi-
dates for stochastically evolutionarily stable states in a particular stochastic model of best-reply
learning a la Young (1993). On the “way” to this result, in addition, we ﬁnd a series of inter-
esting results about the underlying minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence, its ﬁxed points,
and notions of rationalizability based on it. One result, for instance, is that a pure ﬁxed point
of this minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence induces a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (with
weak perfect Bayesian equilibria in every subgame) in the extensive form with the given normal
form as its agent normal form (Proposition 17).
Methodologically there is some overlap with Balkenborg (1992) who, in order to analyze
the properties of persistent retracts, studies the “semi-robust best reply correspondence”, which
diﬀers from the reﬁned best reply correspondences considered here by not being convex val-
ued. Balkenborg, Jansen, and Vermeulen (2001) analyze the invariance of persistent retracts
and equilibria using “sparse strategy selections”. These are particulary useful when no unique
minimal reﬁned best reply correspondence exists.
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst deﬁne the class of games we study in section 2. We
then deﬁne what we call a reﬁnement of the best-reply correspondence in section 3, where we
also characterize the, in the given class of games, unique minimal such reﬁnement. In section 4
we, to some extent, characterize ﬁxed-points of the minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence.
In section 5 we discuss the concept of rationalizability based on the reﬁned best-reply corre-
spondence and its relationship to other notions of rationalizability and Dekel and Fudenberg’s
(1990) S∞W1 elimination procedure. In section 6 we study the notion of a CURB set (Basu and
Weibull (1991)) for the reﬁned best-reply correspondence and prove that it coincides with Kalai
and Samet’s (1984) notion of an absorbing retract. In section 7 we discuss extensive form games.
Section 8 provides a micro-story, similar in spirit to Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996), leading to
a diﬀerential inclusion based on the reﬁned best-reply correspondence, before we prove the main
result in section 9. Section 10 discusses index-theory based on the minimal reﬁned best-reply
correspondence. Section 11 concludes.
The paper has three appendices. Appendix A shows in which sense our restriction to games
with generically unique best replies is not essential. The result in Appendix B implies that
many concepts we consider here coincide in generic normal form games. Appendix C studies
3the special structure of the minimal reﬁned best reply correspondence in two-player games.
2 Preliminaries
Let Γ = (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite n-player normal form game, where I = {1,...,n} is the set of players,
S = ×i∈ISi is the set of pure strategy proﬁles, and u : S → IRn the payoﬀ function1. Let
Θi = ∆(Si) denote the set of player i’s mixed strategies, and let Θ = ×i∈IΘi denote the set of
all mixed strategy proﬁles. Let int(Θ) = {x ∈ Θ : xis > 0 ∀s ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I} denote the set of all
completely mixed strategy proﬁles.
A strategy proﬁle x ∈ Θ may also represent a population state in an evolutionary interpreta-
tion of the game in the following sense. Each player i ∈ I is replaced by a population of agents
playing in player position i and xisi denotes the proportion of players in population i who play
pure strategy si ∈ Si.
For x ∈ Θ let Bi(x) ⊂ Si denote the set of pure-strategy best-replies to x for player i. Let
B(x) = ×i∈IBi(x). Let βi(x) = ∆(Bi(x)) ⊂ Θi denote the set of mixed-strategy best-replies to
x for player i. Let β(x) = ×i∈Iβi(x).
Two strategies xi,yi ∈ Θi are own-payoﬀ equivalent (for player i) if ui(xi,x−i) =
ui(yi,x−i) for all x−i ∈ Θ−i = ×j =iΘj (see Kalai and Samet (1984)). In contrast, Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986) call two strategies xi,yi ∈ Θi payoﬀ equivalent if uj(xi,x−i) = uj(yi,x−i) for
all x−i ∈ Θ−i and for all players j ∈ I. We will use these concepts primarily for pure strategies.
Let Ψ = {x ∈ Θ| B(x) is a singleton}. Notice that the unique best reply against a strategy
combination in Ψ is necessarily a pure strategy. Throughout this paper we will restrict attention
to games Γ for which this set Ψ is dense in Θ. Let this set of games be denoted by G∗. A game
Γ  ∈ G∗ is given by Game 1. Player 1’s best reply set is {A,B} for any (mixed) strategy of player
2. Hence, β(x) is never a singleton and Ψ = ∅ is not dense in Θ. This has to do with the fact




Game 1: A Game in which Ψ is not dense in Θ.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that without equivalent strategies Ψ is dense in Θ. The following
lemma, due to Kalai and Samet (1984), is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 Let U be a non-empty open subset of Θ. Then two strategies xi,yi ∈ Θi are own-
payoﬀ equivalent (for player i) if and only if ui(xi,z−i) = ui(yi,z−i) for all z ∈ U.
Proposition 1 Let Γ be without own-payoﬀ equivalent pure strategies. Then Ψ is dense in Θ;
i.e., Γ ∈ G∗.
Proof: Suppose Ψ is not dense in Θ. Then there is an open set U in Θ such that for all y ∈ U
the pure best-response set B(y) is not a singleton, i.e., has at least two elements. Without loss
of generality, due to the ﬁniteness of S, we can assume that there are two pure strategy-proﬁles
1The function u will also denote the expected utility function in the mixed extension of the game Γ.
4si,ti ∈ Si such that si,ti ∈ Bi(y) for all y ∈ U and some player i ∈ I. But then by Lemma 1, si
and ti are own-payoﬀ equivalent for player i. QED
Note that the converse of Proposition 1 is not true. Consider two own-payoﬀ equivalent strategies
which are strictly dominated by another strategy. If these are the only equivalent strategies in
Γ then Ψ is still dense in Θ. However, the following proposition is immediate. Call xi ∈ Θi a
robust best reply against x ∈ Θ if xi is a best reply against all strategy combinations in a
neighborhood of x. Call xi ∈ Θi a robust strategy if xi is a robust best reply against some
strategy combination x ∈ Θ. This terminology is inspired by Okada (1983).
Proposition 2 Let Γ be such that Ψ is dense in Θ. Let si ∈ Si be a robust strategy. Then
player i has no distinct own-payoﬀ equivalent strategy to si in Si.
Adapting a notion of Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2007) for perfect information games, let
a normal form game satisfy the Single Payoﬀ Condition (SPC) if all own-payoﬀ equivalent pure
strategies are also payoﬀ equivalent. Not every game satisﬁes the SPC: a player other than i
might not be indiﬀerent between player i’s own-payoﬀ equivalent strategies (as is the case in
Game 1). Thus, our restriction that the game should have no own-payoﬀ equivalent strategies
for any player i is a stronger requirement than saying the game has to be in semi-reduced
normal form (see e.g., page 147 in Ritzberger (2002)). However, games not satisfying the SPC
are exceptional. Trivially, for generic normal form games there are neither own-payoﬀ nor payoﬀ
equivalent strategies and hence the SPC holds.2 This is of little interest because most important
classes of normal from games such as normal forms of extensive form games or of ﬁnitely repeated
games are non-generic. Requiring genericity conﬂicts with imposing any additional structure on
the class of games considered.3 In Appendix A we identify a condition on a class of normal form
games which implies that the SPC holds generically within this class. This condition is shown
to be satisﬁed by the classes of normal forms of extensive form games, of ﬁnitely repeated games
and of cheap talk games.
Hence the restriction to games in the class G∗ made throughout the paper is essentially the
restriction to the semi-reduced normal form4 in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Since
we are primarily interested in the best response correspondence this restriction is largely without
loss of generality. In fact, every trajectory of the best reply dynamics of the reduced form of a
normal form game corresponds in a canonical fashion to a family of trajectories in the original
game which projects onto it.
We now turn to the notion of inferior strategies.5
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy si ∈ Si is strictly inferior if for every x ∈ Θ there is a ti ∈ Si such
that ui(si,x−i) < ui(ti,x−i). A strategy wi ∈ Si is weakly inferior if for every x ∈ Θ there is a
ti ∈ Si, ti  = wi such that ui(wi,x−i) ≤ ui(ti,x−i) and ui(wi,y−i) < ui(ti,y−i) for some y ∈ Θ.
2Throughout this paper we say that a property holds generically in some open subset of a Euclidean space if
it fails only on a lower dimensional semi-algebraic or (in Appendix A) semi-analytic set. Such lower-dimensional
sets always have measure zero, are nowhere dense and hence meagre (ﬁrst category).
3For an illuminating discussion on this point see Mertens (2004).
4In particular, we are, for instance, not ruling out games with weakly dominated strategies.
5Our notions of strict and weak inferiority are motivated by, but not identical to, the notion of inferior choices
in Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
5For games in G∗ a strictly inferior strategy si is such that si  ∈ Bi(x) for any x ∈ Θ, while
a weakly inferior strategy wi is such that if wi ∈ Bi(x) then Bi(x) is not a singleton. Note
that every game in G∗ has at least one strategy for each player which is not weakly inferior. If
a strategy is strictly (weakly) dominated then it is strictly (weakly) inferior. The converse is
not true (see Example 5.7 in Ritzberger (2002) for a strategy which is strictly inferior but not
strictly dominated).
Lemma 2 A strategy is robust if and only if it is not weakly inferior.
Proof: If si ∈ Si is not weakly inferior, then there exists an x−i ∈ Θ−i such that, for all ti ∈ Si,
ui (si,x−i) > ui (ti,x−i) or ui (si,y−i) ≥ ui (ti,y−i) holds for all y−i ∈ Θ−i. In the latter case ti
is weakly dominated by si. By continuity si is a best reply in a neighborhood of x−i and hence
a robust strategy. Conversely, if si ∈ Si is robust it is a best reply on a non-empty open set
in Θ. Any strategy which is not own-payoﬀ equivalent to si can, by Lemma 1, be a best reply
jointly with si only on a closed, nowhere dense set. There are only ﬁnitely many pure strategies
to consider and any mixed strategy is a best reply only against strategy proﬁles against which
all pure strategies in its support are also best replies. Thus, there exists a non-empty open set
in Θi such that a strategy of player i is a best response against a strategy proﬁle in this set if
and only if it is own-payoﬀ equivalent to si. Hence si is not weakly inferior. QED
3 Reﬁned best-reply correspondences
A correspondence τ : Θ ⇒ Θ is a reﬁned best-reply correspondence6 if
1. τ(x) = ×i∈Iτi(x) ∀ x ∈ Θ, where τi : Θ ⇒ Θi for all i ∈ I,
2. τi(x) ⊂ βi(x) ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I,
3. τi(x)  = ∅ ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I,
4. τ(x) is convex and closed for all x ∈ Θ,
5. τ(x) is upper-hemi continuous at all x ∈ Θ.
Note ﬁrst that if we replaced property 5 by requiring τ to have a closed graph, then we could
omit the requirement of closedness in property 4. Note, furthermore, that if β(x) is a singleton
then so must be any τ(x) (with τ(x) = β(x)) by properties 2 and 3. In games in G∗ we thus
must have τ(x) = β(x) for all x ∈ Ψ for any reﬁned best-reply correspondence τ. If the best-
response at x, β(x) is a singleton, then it must be a pure strategy proﬁle. For x  ∈ Ψ the set τ(x)
must include all pure strategies which are best responses to some nearby x′ ∈ Ψ by property
57. For such x any τ(x) must then also include all convex combinations of all pure strategies
in τ(x) by property 4. For games in G∗, therefore, the unique minimal such reﬁned best-reply
correspondence, denoted σ : Θ ⇒ Θ, can be found in the following way. For x ∈ Θ let
Si(x) = {si ∈ Si| ∃{xt}∞
t=1 ∈ Ψ : xt → x ∧ Bi(xt) = {si} ∀t}.
6The diﬀerence between such reﬁned best replies and the notion of admissible best replies developed in Mertens
(2004) is subtle because the latter do not have to satisfy our assumptions 1 and 4.
7Strategies that are unique best replies to some x are called inducible in von Stengel and Zamir (2004).
6For games in G∗ the set Si(x) is the set of pure semi-robust best replies deﬁned in Balkenborg
(1992).8 Let S(x) = ×i∈ISi(x). These observations prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let Γ ∈ G∗. The unique minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence is given by σ,
deﬁned such that for any x ∈ Θ, σ(x) = ×i∈I∆(Si(x)).
Note that for games not in G∗ there may well be multiple minimal reﬁned best-reply correspon-
dences. For the most part in this paper we will study games in G∗ only.
The following Proposition says that for generic normal form games the minimal reﬁned
best-reply correspondence coincides everywhere with the best-reply correspondence, i.e., σ ≡ β.
Remember, however, that many games of interest in G∗ (derived for instance from an extensive
form) are not among these generic normal form games.
Proposition 3 For generic normal form games a strategy is a semi-robust best reply if and only
if it is a best reply (i.e., si ∈ Si (x) ⇔ si ∈ Bi (x)). Consequently, the best reply correspondence
is minimal (i.e., xi ∈ σi (x) ⇔ xi ∈ βi (x)) in these games.
For the proof see appendix B. As an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 we have:
Lemma 3 Let wi ∈ Si be weakly inferior for player i. Then wi  ∈ Si(x) (i.e., wi is not a
semi-robust best reply) for any x ∈ Θ.
In two-player games the following reverse statement can be established. Its proof can be found
in appendix C.
Proposition 4 In a two-player game a strategy is a semi-robust best reply, si ∈ Si(x), if and
only if it is a best reply, si ∈ βi(x), and is not weakly inferior.
For two-player games, in fact, we can completely characterize weakly inferior strategies. The
proof is again in appendix C.
Proposition 5 In a two-player game a strategy is weakly inferior if and only if it is weakly
dominated or equivalent to a proper mixture of strategies which are not equivalent.
Proposition 4 implies the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Let Γ = (I,S,u) ∈ G∗ be a two-player game with minimal reﬁned best-reply
correspondence σ(Γ). Then there is a game Γ′ = (I′,S′,u′) ∈ G∗ with I′ = I, S′ = S, and a
payoﬀ function u′ : S → IR2 such that its best-reply correspondence β(Γ′) ≡ σ(Γ).
Proof: Let Γ′ be such that, for every i ∈ I, every s−i ∈ S−i, and every weakly inferior wi ∈ Si,
u′
i(wi,s−i) = ui(wi,s−i) − δ for some δ > 0. Then, for this game Γ′ no weakly inferior strategy
is ever a best reply. Thus, by Proposition 4, σ(Γ) ≡ σ(Γ′) ≡ β(Γ′). QED
Proposition 6 is useful as it tells us that in two-player games, the structure of ﬁxed points of
σ is the same as the structure of Nash equilibria. In particular, it implies that, in two-player
games, there are only ﬁnitely many components of ﬁxed points of σ. More precisely, applying
the results in Jansen, Jurg, and Vermeulen (2002) we have the following.
8Balkenborg (1992) deﬁnes a best reply against x−i as semi-robust if it is a robust best reply against a sequence
of strategy combinations converging to xi
7Corollary 1 Let Γ = (I,S,u) ∈ G∗ be a two-player game with minimal reﬁned best-reply corre-
spondence σ. Then the set of ﬁxed points of σ is the union of ﬁnitely many polytopes and hence













Game 2 and Figure 1: A game where the reﬁned best reply correspondence is not the best reply correspondence
of a modiﬁed game. In Figure 1 the regions where strategies E and F of player 3 are best replies in this game are
indicated in the square of strategy proﬁles of players 1 and 2. The probability with which player 1 chooses B is
indicated vertically downwards in the graph while the probability of player 2 choosing D is indicated horizontally.
In the shaded area between the two branches of the hyperbola E is the best reply for player 3, outside it is F.
The lower branch of the hyperbola intersects the square only in the point (B,D), indicating that F is a best
reply against (B,D), but not semi-robust.
Proposition 6 does not extend to games with three or more players, as the 2 × 2 × 2 game
2 shows. Here and in the following games, player 1 chooses the row, player 2 the column and
player 3 the matrix. In this example we specify the payoﬀs of player 3 only. As indicated
in Figure 1, note that against opponent strategy proﬁles (1/2A + 1/2B,C), (A,1/2C + 1/2D),
and (2/3A + 1/3B,2/3C + 1/3D) (among others) both E and F are semi-robust best replies.
However, against (A,C) F is the only best reply and against (B,D) E is the only semi-robust
best reply. Nearby the latter strategy proﬁle there is no open set in the square of the opponents’
mixed strategy proﬁles where F is a best response.
Now assume there exists another game with the same strategies for which the best response
mapping for player 3 is identical to the minimal reﬁned best response correspondence of the given
game. This implies that player 3 must remain indiﬀerent between E and F against the strategy
proﬁles (1/2A + 1/2B,C) (A,1/2C + 1/2D), and (2/3A + 1/3B,2/3C + 1/3D). Moreover, F
must be a best response against (A,C), but not against (B,D). This implies
1
2
(u3 (A,C,E) − u3 (A,C,F)) −
1
2
(u3 (B,C,E) − u3 (B,C,F)) = 0
1
2
(u3 (A,C,E) − u3 (A,C,F)) −
1
2
(u3 (A,D,E) − u3 (A,D,F)) = 0
4
9
(u3 (A,C,E) − u3 (A,C,F)) −
2
9




(u3 (A,D,E) − u3 (A,D,F)) +
1
9
(u3 (B,D,E) − u3 (B,D,F)) = 0
We conclude that u3 (B,D,E)−u3 (B,D,F) = 0, and, thus F is a best response against (B,D),
a contradiction.
84 Nash equilibrium versus best-reply reﬁnements
This section provides a few results relating ﬁxed points of the (minimal) reﬁned best-reply
correspondence to (reﬁnements of) Nash equilibria.
Proposition 7 Let Γ be a ﬁnite two-player game in G∗. Let x ∈ Θ be a ﬁxed point of the reﬁned
best-reply correspondence σ. Then xiwi = 0 for every weakly inferior wi ∈ Si.
Proof: Immediate from Lemma 3: Let x ∈ σ(x). By Lemma 3 wi  ∈ Si(x) for any weakly inferior
wi ∈ Si. But then no y ∈ Θ with yiwi > 0 can be in σ(x). QED
Selten (1975) introduced the concept of a (trembling-hand) perfect (Nash) equilibrium. A useful
characterization of a perfect equilibrium in normal form games is given in the following lemma,
which is also due to Selten (1975) (see also Proposition 6.1 in Ritzberger (2002) for a textbook
treatment).
Lemma 4 A (possibly mixed) strategy proﬁle x ∈ Θ is a (trembling-hand) perfect (Nash) equi-
librium if there is a sequence {xt}∞
t=1 of completely mixed strategy proﬁles (i.e., each xt ∈ int(Θ))
such that xt converges to x and x ∈ β(xt) for all t.
Not every ﬁxed point of σ is necessarily a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, even in 2-player
games. To see this consider Game 3, taken from Hendon, Jacobson, and Sloth (1996). For this
game σ and β are identical. The mixed strategy proﬁle x∗ = ((0,1/2,1/2);(1/2,0,1/2)) is a
Nash equilibrium, hence a ﬁxed point of β, hence of σ, which, as Hendon, Jacobson, and Sloth
(1996) point out is not perfect. Indeed, while the two pure strategies in the support of x∗
2,
i.e., strategies D and F are not weakly dominated, the mixture x∗
2 is weakly dominated by the
pure strategy E. As weakly dominated strategies in a 2-player game cannot be perfect (see e.g.,
Theorem 3.2.2 in van Damme (1991)), x∗ is not perfect.
D E F
A 0,0 0,1 0,0
B 2,0 2,1 0,2
C 0,2 0,1 2,0
D E F
A 2,2 1,2 1,2
B 2,1 2,2 0,0
C 2,1 0,0 2,2
Game 3: A game in which a ﬁxed point of σ
is not perfect.
Game 4: A game in which a perfect equilib-
rium (and, in fact, KM-stable equilibrium) is
not a ﬁxed point of σ.
Proposition 8 Let Γ be a 2-player game in G∗. Then every pure ﬁxed-point, s ∈ S, of the
reﬁned best-reply correspondence, σ, is a perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Every pure ﬁxed point of σ is undominated by Proposition 7. In two-player games every
undominated Nash equilibrium is (trembling-hand) perfect. QED
The converse of Proposition 8 is not true. Consider Game 4. In this game strategy A (and
similarly D) is equivalent to the mixture of pure strategies B and C (E and F respectively).
However, A is a best-reply only on a thin set of mixed-strategy proﬁles. In fact, A is best against
any x ∈ Θ in which x2E = x2F, the set of which is a thin set. By Proposition 2 this game is in





2 )) is a strictly perfect equilibrium, and hence, constitutes a singleton
KM-stable set. But none of these equilibria, except the one with α = 0, are ﬁxed points of σ,
due to the fact that A (and D) is only best on a thin set (it is a weakly inferior strategy).
Proposition 8 cannot be generalized to general n-player games. To see this consider the
following immediate characterization of ﬁxed points of σ. For xi ∈ Θi let C(xi) = {si ∈
Si|xisi > 0} denote the carrier (or support) of xi.
Lemma 5 Strategy proﬁle x ∈ Θ satisﬁes x ∈ σ(x) if and only if for all i ∈ I and for all
si ∈ C(xi) there is an open set Usi ⊂ Θ, with x in the closure of Usi, such that si ∈ Bi(y) for
all y ∈ Usi.
Suppose x ∈ σ(x). Consider player i. Then for all si ∈ C(xi) let Usi denote this open set in which




si∈C(xi) Usi  = ∅, then x is also trembling-hand perfect. However, this is
not necessarily the case. We already saw this for the 2-player Game 3. In the ﬁxed point of σ,
x∗ = ((0,1/2,1/2);(1/2,0,1/2)), player 2 uses his pure strategies D and F only. D is best in the
open set UD = {x ∈ Θ|x1C > 1
2}, while F is best in the open set UF = {x ∈ Θ|x1B > 1
2}. There
are no bigger open set with the same property. Yet the two sets have an empty intersection.
Hence, x∗ is not perfect. The extensive form game in Figure 5 demonstrates that for games with
more than 2 players this phenomenon may even occur for pure ﬁxed points of σ.
In section 6 we prove that CURB sets (Basu and Weibull (1991)) based on σ give rise
to absorbing retracts (Kalai and Samet (1984)) and minimal such sets give rise to persistent
retracts. One might think that ﬁxed points of σ will have some relation to persistent equilibria
(Nash equilibria in a persistent retract, Kalai and Samet (1984)). This is not true, though.
Note ﬁrst that the mixed equilibrium in the coordination game is not persistent and is a ﬁxed
point of σ. Consider Game 5 taken from Kalai and Samet (1984). The equilibrium (B,D,E)
is perfect and proper but not persistent as Kalai and Samet (1984) point out. It is also a ﬁxed
point of σ. To see this, note that E is weakly dominant for player 3 and that B and D are best
(for players 1 and 2, respectively) against all nearby strategy proﬁles in which player 2 chooses
strategy C with smaller probability than player 3 chooses F and player 1 chooses A with smaller








Game 5: A game in which a pure ﬁxed point of σ is not persistent.
Game 6, taken from Kalai and Samet (1984), demonstrates that there are persistent equilibria
which are not ﬁxed points of σ. The strategy proﬁle (A,C,E) is persistent (see Kalai and Samet
(1984)) but is not a ﬁxed point of σ. To see this note that player 1’s strategy A is never best for
nearby strategy proﬁles. The one pure strategy combination (of players 2 and 3) against which
A is better than B is (D,F) which for nearby (to (A,C,E)) strategy proﬁles will always have








Game 6: A game in which a pure persistent equilibrium is not a ﬁxed point of σ.
5 σ-Rationalizability
A set R ⊂ S is a strategy selection if R = ×i∈IRi and Ri ⊂ Si, Ri  = ∅ for all i. For a
strategy selection R let Θ(R) = ×i∈I∆(Ri) denote set of independent strategy mixtures of the
pure strategies in R. A set Ψ ⊂ Θ is a face if there is a strategy selection R such that Ψ = Θ(R).
Note that Θ = Θ(S). Note also that β(x) = Θ(B(x)) and σ(x) = Θ(S(x)).
For A ⊂ Θ let Bi(A) = {si ∈ Si|si ∈ Bi(x) for some x ∈ A} denote the set of all pure
best-replies for player i to all strategy proﬁles in set A. Let βi(A) = ∆(Bi(A)) denote the





A = Θ, βk(A) is a decreasing sequence, and we denote β∞(Θ) =
T∞
k=1 βk(Θ). A pure strategy
proﬁle s ∈ S is rationalizable if it is an element of the strategy selection R ⊂ S which satisﬁes
Θ(R) = β∞(Θ) (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984); see also Ritzberger (2002), Deﬁnition 5.3
for a textbook treatment).
The same can be done with the reﬁned best-reply correspondence σ. For A ⊂ Θ let Si(A) =
{si ∈ Si : si ∈ Si(x) for some x ∈ A} denote the set of all pure reﬁned best-replies for player
i to all strategy proﬁles in set A. Let σi(A) = ∆(Si(A)). Let σ(A) = ×i∈Iσi(A). For k ≥ 2




. For A = Θ, σk(A) is again a decreasing sequence, and we denote
σ∞(Θ) =
T∞
k=1 σk(Θ). A pure strategy proﬁle s ∈ S is σ-rationalizable if it is an element of
the strategy selection R ⊂ S which satisﬁes Θ(R) = σ∞(Θ).
Using Propositions 3 and 4 we can provide two propositions for generic normal form games
and for two-player games, respectively.
Proposition 9 In generic normal form games a strategy is σ-rationalizable if and only if it
rationalizable.
Proof: This follows immediately from Proposition 3. QED
Proposition 10 In a two-player game the σ-rationalizable strategies are the strategies that sur-
vive one round of elimination of weakly inferior pure strategies followed by the iterated elimina-
tion of strictly dominated strategies.
Proof: This follows from Proposition 4 and the fact that in two-player games strictly inferior
strategies are the same as strictly dominated strategies. QED
For general games in G∗, by the fact that σ(x) ⊂ β(x) for all x ∈ Θ, we obviously have
that the set of σ-rationalizable strategies is a subset of the set of rationalizable strategies.
However, we can say more. Let ˜ Γ = (I,S, ˜ u) denote the game derived from Γ by deﬁning
˜ ui(si,s−i) = ui(si,s−i) − δ, for a ﬁxed positive δ, if si ∈ Si is weakly, and not strictly, inferior
in Γ and ˜ ui(si,s−i) = ui(si,s−i) otherwise. Every pure strategy which is weakly inferior in Γ is,
therefore, strictly inferior in ˜ Γ. Let ˜ β denote the best-reply correspondence of ˜ Γ. Then we have
the following lemma.
11Lemma 6 For ˜ Γ and ˜ β deﬁned as above we have σ(x) ⊂ ˜ β(x) for all x ∈ Θ.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 3. QED
The reﬁned best-reply set σ(x) may, for some games Γ and some x ∈ Θ, be a proper subset of
˜ β(x). To see this consider Game 7, taken from van Damme (1991), Figure 2.2.1; see also exercise
6.10 in Ritzberger (2002). In this game strategies D and F are strictly inferior for players 2
and 3, respectively. There are no strategies which are weakly but not strictly inferior. Hence,
˜ β(x) = β(x) for any x ∈ Θ. Player 1’s strategy B is (the unique) best strategy when players
2 and 3 play D and F, respectively. Both A and B are best when players 2 and 3 play C and
E, respectively. However, for any (mixed) strategy proﬁle, y ∈ Θ in which players 2 and 3 play
close to C and E, A is the unique best reply. Hence, B  ∈ S1(x) for any x ∈ Θ for which x2C = 1
and x3E = 1. Therefore, S1(x) = {A} is indeed a proper subset of B1(x) = {A,B} for any such
x, and, hence, σ(x) is a proper subset of ˜ β(x) for any such x. In fact, this game is usually used
to illustrate that in 3-player games an undominated Nash equilibrium, (B,C,E), need not be








Game 7: A game in which for some x ∈ Θ, σ(x) is a proper subset of ˜ β(x).
Let ˜ β∞ be deﬁned analogously to β∞. We call a pure strategy s ∈ S Dekel-Fudenberg
rationalizable (or DF-rationalizable9) if it is an element of the strategy selection R ⊂ S which
satisﬁes Θ(R) = ˜ β∞(Θ).
Proposition 11 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Every σ-rationalizable strategy for Γ is DF-rationalizable.
Note that for two-player games Proposition 10 actually implies that a strategy is σ-rationalizable
if and only if it is DF-rationalizable. In fact for two-player games without pure strategies which
are equivalent to a proper mixture of two or more pure strategies we have that, by Proposition
5, a strategy is σ-rationalizable if and only if it survives the DF-procedure (see footnote 9).
Game 7 illustrates that the set of σ-rationalizable strategies, here {A} × {C} × {E}, may
well be a proper subset of the set of DF-rationalizable strategies, here {A,B} × {C} × {E}.
There are a variety of reﬁnements of the concept of (uncorrelated) rationalizability of Bern-
heim (1984) and Pearce (1984). The ones we are aware of are cautious rationalizabil-
ity (Pearce (1984)), perfect rationalizability (Bernheim (1984)), proper rationalizabil-
ity (Schuhmacher (1999)), trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, and weak perfect
rationalizability (both Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999)).
9Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) allow players to hold beliefs which are arbitrary distributions over the set of
possible opposition play. This gives rise to what one might call DF correlated rationalizability (see Ritzberger
(2002), p.209, for a discussion of rationalizability versus correlated rationalizability; see also B¨ orgers (1994) and
Brandenburger (1992) for epistemic conditions under which DF correlated rationalizability is obtained). A strategy
is DF correlated rationalizable if and only if it survives the DF-procedure (or S
∞W-procedure), i.e., one round of
elimination of all pure weakly dominated strategies and then the iterated deletion of all pure strictly dominated
strategies. The set of DF-rationalizable strategies is contained in the set of correlated DF rationalizable strategies.
12Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999) study the relationship between all these concepts. They
ﬁnd that perfect and proper rationalizability both imply weakly perfect rationalizability and
provide counter-examples to every other possible set-inclusion. We do not want to go into
the various deﬁnitions here now, but will just point out how these concepts are related to σ-
rationalizability as deﬁned in this paper.
In Game 4 all of the above reﬁnements of rationalizability yield the whole strategy set,
while σ-rationalizability leads to the smaller set {B,C} × {E,F}. In Game 8, trembling hand
perfect rationalizability yields, with {A}×{D}, a subset of the set of σ-rationalizable strategies,
{A,B} × {D,E}. In the game, derived from Game 8 by replacing C and F with strictly
dominated strategies, and not changing the payoﬀs other strategies obtain against C and F,
the set of cautiously rationalizable strategies, {A} × {D}, is a proper subset of the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies, again given by {A,B} × {D,E}. In the semi-reduced normal form,
Game 10, of the extensive form game given in Figure 3, the set of properly rationalizable
strategies, {A}×{F}, is smaller than the set of σ-rationalizable strategies, {A,B,C}×{D,F}.
While we thus have no systematic relationship between the concepts of cautious, trembling hand
perfect, proper, and σ-rationalizability, it may well be the case that perfect and weakly perfect
rationalizability, both as deﬁned in Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999), are, sometimes strictly,
weaker criteria than σ-rationalizability. This issue is open.
To illustrate that σ-rationalizability does not always allow the iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies, unlike trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, consider Game 8 from
Samuelson (1992). In this game strategies C and F are weakly dominated, and, hence, not
σ-rationalizable. In the semi-reduced game without strategies C and F, strategies B and E are
now weakly dominated, and, hence, not trembling-hand perfect rationalizable. However, B (the
analogue holds for E) is a best reply against completely mixed strategy proﬁles close to D, in
which the weight on F is greater than the weight on E. Hence, S1(x) = {A,B} for any such
x ∈ Θ. Hence, B is σ-rationalizable.
D E F
A 1,1 1,1 2,1
B 1,1 0,0 3,1





Game 8: A game in which the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies includes an iteratively
weakly dominated strategy.
Game 9: A game in which there are SAS not
in any minimal σ-CURB set.
In some special contexts σ-rationalizability does allow the iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies. See section 7.
6 σ-CURB sets
The following deﬁnitions are due to Basu and Weibull (1991). A strategy selection R is a
CURB set if B(Θ(R)) ⊂ R. It is a tight CURB set if, in addition B(Θ(R)) ⊃ R, and, hence,
B(Θ(R)) = R. It is a minimal CURB set if it does not properly contain another CURB set.
We deﬁne σ-CURB sets in a similar fashion. A strategy selection R is a σ-CURB set if
S(Θ(R)) ⊂ R. It is a tight σ-CURB set if, in addition S(Θ(R)) ⊃ R, and, hence, S(Θ(R)) =
R. It is a minimal σ-CURB set if it does not properly contain another σ-CURB set.
13Note that every CURB set is a σ-CURB set. In fact even every Basu and Weibull’s (1991)
CURB∗-set, a CURB set without weakly dominated strategies, is a σ-CURB set. Game 7
illustrates that a σ-CURB set may well be a proper subset of even a minimal CURB∗-set. In
this game the unique minimal CURB∗-set (and minimal CURB set) is the set {A,B}×{C}×{E},
while the unique minimal σ-CURB set is the set {A} × {C} × {E}.
The following deﬁnitions are due to Kalai and Samet (1984). A set Ψ ⊂ Θ is a retract if
Ψ = ×i∈IΨi, where Ψi ⊂ Θi is nonempty, compact, and convex. A set Ψ ⊂ Θ absorbs another
set Ψ′ ⊂ Θ if for all x ∈ Ψ′ we have that β(x) ∩ Ψ  = ∅. A retract Ψ is an absorbing retract
if it absorbs a neighborhood of itself. It is a persistent retract if it does not properly contain
another absorbing retract. Kalai and Samet (1984) show that, for games without equivalent
strategies, and, hence, for games in G∗, persistent retracts have to be faces.
Theorem 2 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A strategy selection R ⊂ S is a σ-CURB set if and only if Θ(R) is an
absorbing retract.
Proof: ”⇐”: Let the strategy selection R ⊂ S be such that Θ(R) is an absorbing retract, i.e.,
it absorbs a neighborhood of itself. Let U be such a neighborhood of Θ(R). We then have that
for every y ∈ U there is an r ∈ R such that r ∈ B(y). For all r ∈ R let Ur = {y ∈ U|r ∈ B(y)}.
We obviously have
S
r∈R Ur = U. Suppose R is not a σ-CURB set. Then there is a player i ∈ I
and a pure strategy si ∈ Si \Ri such that si ∈ Si(x) for some x ∈ Θ(R). By the deﬁnition of Si
we must then have that si ∈ β(y) for all y ∈ O for some open set O which contains x. But then,
by the ﬁniteness of R, there is a strategy proﬁle r ∈ R such that Ur and O have an intersection
which contains an open set. On this set si and ri are now both best replies. But then, by Lemma
1, si and ri are equivalent for player i, which, by Proposition 2, contradicts our assumption.
”⇒”: Suppose R ⊂ S is a σ-CURB set. Suppose that Θ(R) is not an absorbing retract. Then
for every neighborhood U of Θ(R) there is a yU ∈ U such that β(yU) ∩ Θ(R) = ∅. In particular
for every such yU there is a player i ∈ I and a pure strategy si ∈ Si \ Ri such that si ∈ Bi(yU).
By the ﬁniteness of the number of players and pure strategies and by the compactness of Θ,
this means that there is a convergent subsequence of yU ∈ int(Θ) such that yU → x for some
x ∈ Θ(R) and there is an i ∈ I and an si ∈ Si \ Ri such that si ∈ Bi(yU) for all such yU. Now
one of two things must be true. Either si is a best-reply in an open set with closure intersecting
Θ(R), in which case si ∈ Ri given the deﬁnition of σ and a σ-CURB set, which gives rise to a
contradiction. Or there is no open set with closure intersecting Θ(R) such that si is best on the
whole open set, in which case there must be a strategy ri ∈ Ri which is such that ri ∈ β(yU) at
least for a subsequence of all such yU, which again gives rise to a contradiction. QED
Theorem 2 allows us to derive two corollaries.
Corollary 2 In generic normal form games a strategy selection R is a minimal curb set if and
only if Θ(R) is a persistent retract.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 2 and Proposition 3. QED
Corollary 3 Consider a strategy selection R in a two-payer game in G∗. Then R is a minimal
curb set of the game where all weakly inferior strategies have been eliminated if and only if Θ(R)
is a persistent retract.
14Proof: This follows from Theorem 2 and Proposition 4. QED
Theorem 2 together with the following lemma can be used to provide an alternative and simple
proof of Kalai and Samet (1984)’s proposition that two distinct persistent retracts have an empty
intersection. Let R be a strategy selection. Let Ci(R) = Ri∪Si(Θ(R)). Let C(R) = ×i∈ICi(R).





Finally let C∞(R) =
S∞
k=0 Ck(R).
Lemma 7 Let R be a strategy selection. Then the above deﬁned set C∞(R) is a σ-CURB set.
Proof: By construction. QED
Note that the set C∞(R) is not necessarily a tight nor a minimal σ-CURB set.
Proposition 12 Let R and R′ be two minimal σ-CURB sets. Suppose R ∩ R′  = ∅. Then
R = R′.
Proof: Suppose s ∈ R ∩ R′. Then {s} is a strategy selection and C∞({s}) ⊂ R by the fact that
R is a σ-CURB set. But, analogously, C∞({s}) ⊂ R′. By Lemma 7 C∞({s}) is a σ-CURB set.
By the minimality of both R and R′ we have the desired result. QED
Note that the same construction (replacing Si with Bi in the deﬁnition of Ci(R)) can be used
to show that two minimal CURB sets are either disjoint or identical.
We conclude this section with comparing σ-CURB sets to two other recent solution con-
cepts based on strategy selections. Voorneveld (2004) introduces the concept of a prep set (for
preparation). A prep set is a strategy selection R ⊂ S such that Bi(Θ(R)) ∩ Ri  = ∅. Hence
every player has at least one best response in her part of the prep set against all beliefs over
opponents’ play within their parts of the prep set. Generically, see Voorneveld (2005), prep
sets and CURB sets are the same, which, by Corollary 2 implies that generically also prep sets
and σ-CURB sets (or persistent retracts) are the same. The proof of this last statement was
ﬁrst given in Balkenborg (1992). We reproduce it here in Appendix B. However, other than in
generic games, prep sets and σ-CURB sets do not have much in common. Every pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, weakly inferior or not, is a minimal prep set. Eliminating weakly inferior (or
at least weakly dominated) strategies was one of our objectives with this paper, and no minimal
σ-CURB set includes one.
Another recent solution concept based on strategy selections is that of a self admissible set
or SAS introduced by Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008) motivated by epistemic
considerations of common knowledge of rationality with the avoidance of weakly dominated
strategies built-in. SAS are deﬁned for two-player games only. A strategy selection R ⊂ S
is an SAS if three conditions are satisﬁed. First, every strategy si ∈ Ri has to be admissible
(not weakly dominated). Second, every strategy si ∈ Ri has to be admissible in the restricted
game given by strategy space Si × R−i, where R−i, here, is the single opponent’s strategy
selection. Third, if si ∈ Ri and si is own-payoﬀ equivalent to a proper mixture of two or
more pure strategies in Si then all these pure strategies also have to be in Ri. Recall that,
by Proposition 5, weakly inferior strategies in two-player games are those strategies which are
either weakly dominated or equivalent to a proper mixture of pure strategies. Recall, further,
that by Proposition 4, a best reply which is not weakly inferior is a semi-robust best reply, i.e.
in Si(x). This implies the following interesting observation.
15Proposition 13 In two-player games, a singleton strategy selection (i.e. a pure strategy proﬁle)
is a singleton SAS if and only if it is a ﬁxed point of σ.
Proof: Let {s}, for s ∈ S, be a singleton SAS. Let si be an arbitrary player i’s part of it. Then
the ﬁrst condition implies that si is not weakly dominated, and the third condition implies that
it cannot be equivalent to a proper mixture of pure strategies. By Proposition 5 it is, therefore,
not weakly inferior, the game being a two-player game. By the second condition of an SAS
s must be a Nash equilibrium, i.e. si a best reply to s−i. But then by Proposition 4 si is a
semi-robust best reply, and, hence, s is a ﬁxed point of σ. To see the converse, note that if s is a
ﬁxed point of σ it must be such that si is not weakly dominated and not equivalent to a proper
mixture of pure strategies by Proposition 5, thus satisfying conditions 1 and 3 of an SAS. A
ﬁxed point of σ is a best reply to itself and, hence, condition 2 of an SAS is also satisﬁed. QED
It is, however, not true that σ-CURB sets (not even minimal ones) are also SAS. To see this
consider Game 8. The unique minimal σ-CURB set is {A,B} × {D,E}, yet it is not SAS as
strategy B is weakly dominated in the restricted game. It does, however, contain an SAS. In fact
three of them: {A,D},{A,E}, and {B,D} are all SAS. There are also SAS outside minimal σ-
CURB sets. To see this consider Game 9 taken from Figure 2.7 in Brandenburger, Friedenberg,
and Keisler (2008). Here, the unique minimal σ-CURB set is {D}×{R}, which is also an SAS,
but there are two more SAS: {U} × {L} and {U} × {L,R}.
In any case exploring the connection with SAS in more detail seems of interest. Also extend-
ing SAS concepts and their epistemic foundations to 3 or more player games, perhaps with the
requirement not of avoiding weakly dominant strategies, but perhaps weakly inferior strategies
could be fruitful.
7 Extensive form games
In this section we investigate what the various concepts based on the reﬁned best-reply corre-
spondence give rise to in extensive form games. We will look at both the agent normal form as
well as the semi-reduced normal form.
We ﬁrst consider extensive form games of perfect information (EFGOPI). Note that the
agent normal form of such games is in G∗ as long as no player has 2 or more equivalent actions
at any of her information sets (which here are singletons, i.e., nodes). Not every normal form
derived from even a generic extensive form game of perfect information (GEFGOPI) is in G∗.
Consider the 1-player extensive form game, given in Figure 2, in which at node 1 the player has
two choices, L and R, where L terminates the game, while R leads to a second node, where
the player again faces two choices l and r. The two pure strategies Ll and Lr are obviously
equivalent. The semi-reduced normal form has been introduced to eliminate exactly this type









Figure 2: A 1-player extensive form game.
Proposition 14 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a GEFGOPI. Then only the (unique)
subgame-perfect strategy proﬁle is σ-rationalizable.
Proof: Consider a ﬁnal node. A strategy, available to the player, say, i at this node, which is not
subgame perfect is weakly dominated. Hence, it can not be in Si(x) for any x ∈ Θ. So it is not
in σ(Θ). Now consider an immediate predecessor node to the above ﬁnal node. A non-subgame
perfect strategy at this node can only be a best-reply if the behavior at the following nodes is
non-subgame perfect. For any x ∈ Θ in a neighborhood of σ(Θ) this is still true. Hence, any
such non-subgame perfect strategy at this node can not be in σ2(Θ). This argument can be
reiterated any ﬁnite number of times. QED
Proposition 15 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a GEFGOPI. The only ﬁxed point of
σ for this game is the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Every ﬁxed point of σ is in the set of σ-rationalizable strategies. This set, by Proposition

















A 3,0 3,0 3,0
B 4,3 1,2 1,2
C 4,3 0,1 2,4
Figure 3: A centipede game. Game 10: The normal form game of the cen-
tipede game in Figure 3.
None of the above propositions is true for the semi-reduced normal form. Consider the centipede
game (Figure 8.2.2 in Cressman (2003)) given here in Figure 3 with semi-reduced normal form
given as Game 10, where player 1’s strategies are A = Ll|Lr, B = Rl, and C = Rr, while player
2’s strategies are D = Ll|Lr, E = Rl, and F = Rr. This game is a GEFGOPI and, hence, has
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which is (Lr,Rr). The set of σ-rationalizable strategies
is {A,B,C} × {D,F}, a lot more than just the subgame perfect strategy-proﬁle. Also the non-
subgame perfect, and, hence, non weak-perfect Bayesian and non-sequential, Nash equilibrium
(B,D) is a ﬁxed point of σ. So indeed, ﬁxed points of σ in a given normal form game need not
17induce sequential or even weak perfect Bayesian equilibria in every extensive form game with
this semi-reduced normal form.
Also not every sequential equilibrium is necessarily a ﬁxed point of σ. The game given in
Figure 4, Figure 13 in Kreps and Wilson (1982), has a sequential equilibrium (L,r) which is not
a ﬁxed point of σ (it is not perfect). Here the agent normal form and the semi-reduced normal














Figure 4: A game with a sequential equilib-
rium (L,r) which is not a ﬁxed point of σ.
Game 11: The normal form of the game in
Figure 4.
There are even extensive form games in agent normal form in which a ﬁxed point of σ is not
a sequential equilibrium. Consider the game in Figure 5. The Nash equilibrium (A,R,r) is a




















Figure 5: A game in which there is a ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form which is not sequential
(and, hence, not extensive form trembling hand perfect).
To see that (A,R,r) is a ﬁxed point of σ we need to check that each strategy choice is a best
reply in an open set around (A,R,r). For player 1’s choice A this is deﬁnitely true as A weakly
dominates both B and C. Player 2’s choice R is best as long as player 1 is suﬃciently more
likely to tremble to C than to B. In fact the probability of C has to be at least twice that of B.
Player 2’s payoﬀs are unaﬀected by player 3’s choice. Player 3’s choice r is best as long as player
1 trembles suﬃciently more to B than to C. In fact the probability of B has to be at least twice
that of C. This is true for whatever player 2 does. Hence, for each player’s strategy choice there
is an open set of strategy proﬁles around (A,R,r) against which the player’s choice is a best
reply. Hence, (A,R,r) is indeed a ﬁxed point of σ. However, these open sets (for players 2 and
3) are mutually exclusive. This in turn means that there is no system of consistent beliefs for
players 2 and 3 which make both choices R and r best replies simultaneously. Player 2’s belief
that sustains the (A,R,r) equilibrium is such that his ﬁrst node has conditional probability of
at most 1/3. Player 3’s belief that sustains the (A,R,r) equilibrium is such that her ﬁrst node
18has conditional probability of at least 2/3. But in a sequential equilibrium these two beliefs
would have to coincide. Thus this (A,R,r) is not sequential (and not trembling-hand perfect).
The following proposition states that any pure ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form
of an extensive form game induces a (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see e.g., Deﬁnition
9.C.3 in Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995) or Deﬁnition 6.2 in Ritzberger (2002)) in this
extensive form game.
Proposition 16 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of an extensive form game. Then if
a pure strategy proﬁle s is a ﬁxed point of σ it induces a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this
extensive form game.
Proof: Let si be player i’s part of the pure strategy proﬁle s. Given s is a ﬁxed point of σ we
have by Lemma 5 that there is an open set Usi ⊂ Θ with its closure containing s, such that
si ∈ Bi(y) for any y ∈ Usi. But then there is a sequence of completely mixed yt ∈ intΘ such
that yt converges to s and si ∈ Bi(yt) for all these yt. Being completely interior every such yt
induces a unique probability distribution over all nodes in all information sets of every player.
In particular also for player i. But then there is a unique consistent belief for player i,  t, given
yt. But then the sequence  t must have a convergent subsequence, which converges to some
feasible belief  , consistent with s wherever possible, and such that s is optimal given belief  .
Hence, s is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. QED
Whether this result is true for mixed ﬁxed-points is not clear. The diﬃculty here is that if the
support of xi, C(xi), contains two pure strategies, one may not be able to ﬁnd one belief  
justifying both pure strategies. It may be the case that both pure strategies are justiﬁable, but
only with diﬀerent beliefs. But then x would not be a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
However, ﬁxed points of σ in the agent normal form have another surprising property. They
induce ﬁxed points of σ in every subgame.
Proposition 17 Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of a given extensive form game. Then if
a strategy proﬁle x is a ﬁxed point of σ it is also a ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form of
every subgame of this extensive form game.
Proof: Let Γ ∈ G∗ be the agent normal form of the given extensive form game. Let Θ denote
the space of mixed strategies. Let x ∈ Θ be a ﬁxed point of σ. Consider player (agent) i ∈ I,
where I is the set of all agents. Player i only moves once, i.e. has only one information set. By
the deﬁnition of σi(x) = ∆(Si(x)), player i, in xi ∈ σi(x) is exclusively randomizing over pure
strategies, each of which are unique best replies to some x′ ∈ Θ (possibly diﬀerent for diﬀerent
si ∈ Si) in a neighborhood of x. In fact, for each si ∈ Si(x), and, hence, for each si ∈ C(xi)
we have that there is a sequence of xt ∈ Θ such that xt → x and Bi(xt) = {si}. Now consider
any subgame in which player i also moves. Let Γ′ = (I′,S′,u′) denote its agent normal form.
Obviously I′ ⊂ I and for all i ∈ I′ we have S′
i = Si and u′ is deﬁned accordingly. Now for every
si ∈ C(xi) consider the projection of xt ∈ Θ onto the reduced game Γ′. Let it be denoted by
ˆ xt ∈ Θ′. Hence we simply have that ˆ xt
i = xt
i for all i ∈ I′. Now consider for the exact sequence
of xt ∈ Θ such that xt → x and Bi(xt) = {si} its projection. Obviously we have that ˆ xt → ˆ x
and also we must have that B′
i(ˆ xt) ⊂ Bi(xt). This is so because either in x player i’s information
is reached, in which case player i’s best responses cannot change in the subgame, or player i’s
information set is not reached in x, and, hence, every strategy of player i is a best response
19against x in the full game. But now given Bi(xt) = {si} we must also have B′
i(ˆ xt) = {si} for the
whole sequence of ˆ xt. But this is nothing but saying that si ∈ S′
i(ˆ x) and, as this is true for all
si ∈ C(xi) and all players i ∈ I′ we have that ˆ x is a ﬁxed point of σ in Γ′. QED
Proposition 17 therefore implies that every ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form of an
extensive form game is automatically subgame perfect. Propositions 17 and 16 together imply
that every pure ﬁxed point of σ in the agent normal form of an extensive form game is weak
perfect Bayesian in every subgame.
8 Micro models of learning
In this section we shall sketch two micro models of learning in the spirit of the models in
Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996) which give rise to the (unreﬁned) best-reply dynamics (1) and
the minimal reﬁned best reply dynamics (2), respectively. In section 9 we shall discuss properties
of the latter dynamics in some detail.
8.1 A micro model leading to the (unreﬁned) best-reply dynamics
This subsection provides a model of individual learning which gives rise to the original, unreﬁned
best-reply dynamics (1). Suppose there is a continuum of agents for each player i ∈ I. Players
only play pure strategies. Then a (mixed) strategy-proﬁle x ∈ Θ represents a state in the
following sense. For player population i ∈ I, xis denotes the proportion of agents in this
population who play pure strategy s ∈ Si. Over time agents review their strategies at a given
rate, r = 1, which we will assume ﬁxed and the same for all agents in all populations. Any
agent, in any population, who is reviewing her strategy is assumed to switch to any pure best
reply against the current state x. If the agent is currently already playing a best reply the agent
may nevertheless switch to an alternative best reply if there is one. Suppose s ∈ Si is such that
s  ∈ Bi(x). Then every reviewing s-strategist will switch away from strategy s to a best-reply,
while no other agent will switch to s either. Hence, ˙ xis = −xis. Now suppose {s} = Bi(x), i.e.,
s is the unique best reply to current state x ∈ Θ. Then every reviewing s-strategist will remain
to be one, while every other reviewing agent will switch to s. Hence, ˙ xis =
P
t =s xit = 1 − xis.
Suppose, ﬁnally, that s ∈ Bi(x) and Bi(x) is not a singleton. Then reviewing s-strategists
may or may not switch to something else, while all other reviewing agents may or may not switch
to s. We could here specify for every such situation (or state x ∈ Θ) a ﬁxed particular probability
distribution over best replies with probability mass function pi(x) ∈ βi(x), which individuals
use to randomly choose one of their best replies given state x. For instance, for a given state
x and a given player i with Bi(x) containing at least two elements we could specify, for a given
s ∈ Bi(x), that pi(x)(s) = α ∈ [0,1]. In this case we would have ˙ xis = (1 − xis)α − xis(1 − α),
which leads to ˙ xis = α − xis.
Diﬀerent choices of pi(x) would then generate diﬀerent systems of diﬀerential equations.
Making a particular choice for all pi(x) functions is problematic in two ways, one conceptually,
and one technically. The conceptual problem with choosing a particular set of pi(x) functions is
that it is simply arbitrary. Why would one choice of pi(x) functions be preferred over another?
The technical problem is that a particular choice of pi(x) typically leads to a discontinuous
vector ﬁeld, which generally does not admit solutions for all initial conditions. Both problems
are solved if we simply allow at every state x ∈ Θ incremental changes towards all best responses.
20But this then is nothing but the system of diﬀerential inclusions
˙ x ∈ β(x) − x, (1)
which is the best reply dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui (1991).
8.2 A micro model leading to the reﬁned best-reply dynamics
In section 9 we will ﬁnally consider the reﬁned best-reply dynamics
˙ x ∈ σ(x) − x, (2)
where σ is as in section 3. In this section we provide a micro-motivation for this reﬁned best-
reply dynamics (2) based on the above given micro model which leads to the unreﬁned best-reply
dynamics (1).
In order to motivate their best-reply dynamics Gilboa and Matsui (1991) also sketch a micro
model of learning. In Gilboa and Matsui (1991)’s story, however, it is assumed that agents do
not exactly know the current state, or, as Gilboa and Matsui (1991) call it, the current behavior
pattern. In fact they assume that ”..., there is a limitation [on the agents part] of recognizing the
current behavior pattern ...” and that agents choose a ”... best response to a possibly diﬀerent
behavior pattern which is in the ǫ-neighborhood of the current one.” (Gilboa and Matsui (1991),
p. 863).
Let us here now also assume that agents do not exactly know the current state x ∈ Θ, but we
will force them to hold a belief about the current state, drawn from some (absolutely continuous)
distribution over the intersection of Θ and an ǫ-ball around x. Agents then choose a best reply
to their belief.
To make this precise, we assume that, at some time t, every reviewing agent always holds a
prior belief  0 ∈ Θ about x where each agent’s  0 is independently drawn from a distribution
F on Θ, where F is an arbitrary distribution with a density that is positive almost everywhere,
i.e., this density is 0 only on a set with Lebesgue-measure 0. This means there is heterogeneity
in agents’ prior beliefs. Every agent then learns what a proportion of 1−ǫ of all agents in every
population are doing and updates her belief accordingly. This updated belief  1 then has a
distribution which has support only within an ǫ-ball, Ux
ǫ , around the true state x. This ǫ-ball is
with respect to the sup-norm, i.e., Ux
ǫ = {y ∈ Θ|||x − y||∞ ≤ ǫ}, where ||   ||∞ denotes the sup
(or max) norm. The density of this posterior distribution is then positive almost everywhere
within Ux
ǫ , i.e., within Ux
ǫ it is 0 only on a set with Lebesgue-measure 0 again.
An agent after updating her belief will then play a best response to her belief. Given the
heterogeneity in beliefs diﬀerent agents might choose diﬀerent best responses. In fact a particular
choice of F, the distribution agents independently choose their priors from, for any given i and
any given state x, leads to a particular distribution pi(x) which reviewing individuals choose
their best replies from, where pi(x) is very much as in the micro story sketched in the previous
subsection. However, now not all such pi(x) ∈ βi(x) are possible. In fact, given the essentially
full support assumption for F, pure strategies which are best replies to x only on a thin set
(Lebesgue-measure 0), such as Ψ ∩ Ux
ǫ , within the ǫ-ball around x will only be chosen by a
vanishing fraction of reviewing agents for all such prior distributions F and, hence, have to
receive probability 0 in pi(x). In fact we must have pi(x) ∈ σi(x).
Diﬀerent choices of F will lead to diﬀerent systems of reﬁned best-response diﬀerential equa-
tions. Again both for conceptual and technical reasons it seems more reasonable to allow all
21such diﬀerentials towards reﬁned best responses. This, if ǫ is small enough, then leads to the
diﬀerential inclusion (2), which we call the minimal reﬁned best-reply dynamics.
9 The reﬁned best-reply dynamics: Results
Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Matsui (1992) and Hofbauer (1995) introduced and studied the
continuous time best reply dynamics (1), which is, modulo a time change, equivalent to Brown
(1951)’s continuous time version of ﬁctitious play. A solution to (1) is an absolutely continuous
function x(t), deﬁned for at least all t ≥ 0, that satisﬁes (1) for almost all t. 10 General theory
guarantees the existence of at least one solution ξ(t,x0) through each initial state x0. In general,
several solutions can exist through a given initial state. In some games, there appear to be too
many of them.
For Game 12, within the component of NE any function x(t) with −xi ≤ ˙ xi ≤ 1 − xi (i.e.,
which does not move too quickly) is a solution while all nearby interior solutions move straight
to AC, see Figure 6. We can, in fact, eliminate these unnatural solutions by looking at the




































































































































































    
Game 12: A game in which the BR dynamics
seems to have ‘too many’ solutions.
Figure 6: Best response dynamics of Game 12.
Since the right hand side of (2) is UHC with compact and convex values, existence of at least
one Lipschitz-continuous solution x(t) through each initial state x(0) is again guaranteed.
The mathematical motivation to consider this reﬁned inclusion is the classical approach
(due to Filippov, see Aubin and Cellina (1984)) to regularize a diﬀerential equation with a
piecewise smooth right hand side. In our case this means, we view the best reply dynamics (1)
as a piecewise linear diﬀerential equation, deﬁned for x in the open dense set Ψ only. In this
approach one considers at each point of discontinuity (i.e., x / ∈ Ψ) the convex hull of all limit
points of nearby values. This leads to the smallest UHC correspondence with compact convex
values that contains the graph of the given discontinuous single-valued function. Applying this
10Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992) require additionally the right diﬀerentiability of solutions. Hof-
bauer (1995) argued that all solutions in the sense of diﬀerential inclusions should be admitted. This is natural
for applications to discrete approximations (ﬁctitious play, see Hofbauer and Sorin (2006)) or stochastic approxi-
mations, see Benaim, Hofbauer, and Sorin (2005). Note that any absolutely continuous solution is automatically
Lipschitz, since the right hand side of (1) is bounded. Hofbauer (1995) also provides an explicit construction of
all piecewise linear solutions (for 2 person games) and provides conditions when these constitute all solutions. See
also Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) and Cressman (2003).
22idea to games (in the class G∗) leads to the correspondence σ and the dynamics (2) instead of
the classical best reply correspondence β and the dynamics (1).
As another simple example take Game 13 which is the restriction of Game 9 without the
strictly dominated strategy M. This game is also known as the ultimatum minigame, see
Cressman (2003). This game has a strict Nash equilibrium (D,R) and a component of Nash
equilibria, where the column player uses the weakly dominated strategy L. The strict equilibrium




                                                                               
 
 
Game 13: Ultimatum minigame. Figure 7: Best response dynamics of Game 13.
We show now that the reﬁned best-reply dynamics converges to the set of σ-rationalizable
strategies, and that every σ-CURB set is asymptotically stable under this dynamics. The proofs
are the same as the proofs of the statements that every solution of the best-reply dynamic (1)
converges to the set of rationalizable strategies and that every CURB set is asymptotically stable
under the best-reply dynamics. These results are analogous to the results of Hurkens (1995),
who for a stochastic learning model a la Young (1993) showed that recurrent sets coincide with
CURB sets or persistent retracts depending on the details of the model.
Theorem 3 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let R be the strategy selection of S which spans the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies, i.e., Θ(R) = σ∞(Θ). Let si ∈ Si \ Ri. Then xisi(t) → 0 for any
solution x( ) to (2) for any initial state x(0) ∈ Θ.
Proof: The proof is by induction on k, the iteration in the deletion process, i.e., the k in
σ∞(Θ) =
T∞
k=1 σk(Θ). Let Rk denote the strategy selection of S which spans σk(Θ), i.e.,
Θ(Rk) = σk(Θ). For k = 1 consider an arbitrary strategy si ∈ Si \ R1
i. By deﬁnition then
si  ∈ Si(x) for any x ∈ Θ. Hence its growth rate according to (2) is ˙ xisi = 0−xisi, and therefore
xisi(t) = e−txisi (3)
for all t ≥ 0, i.e., xisi(t) shrinks exponentially to zero. This proves the statement of the theorem
for si ∈ Si \ R1
i. Now assume the statement of the theorem is true for si ∈ Si \ Rk−1
i , i.e., for
any such si we have that xisi(t) → 0 for any solution x( ) to (2) for any initial state x(0) ∈ Θ.
Then for any such si and for any x(0) ∈ Θ there is a ﬁnite T such that xisi(t) < ǫ for all t ≥ T.
Now by the deﬁnition of σ, si ∈ Si \ Rk
i implies that si  ∈ Si (x(t)) provided ǫ is small enough
(or t large enough). But then for all t ≥ T we again have that ˙ xisi = 0 − xisi and, hence, that
xisi(t) shrinks exponentially to zero. QED
23Given a diﬀerential inclusion on Θ and the corresponding multivalued semi-ﬂow Φt : Θ → Θ
(t ≥ 0), see Benaim, Hofbauer, and Sorin (2005), we deﬁne its global attractor as the set
A =
T
t≥0 Φt(Θ). It consists of all x ∈ Θ for which there is a full solution x(t) ∈ Θ (i.e., deﬁned
for all t ∈ IR) with x(0) = x. Since a forward solution exists always, the restrictive requirement
is that this can be extended backwards for all negative times, without leaving Θ. The global
attractor is compact, invariant and asymptotically stable, indeed the maximal subset of Θ with
these properties. For applications of this useful concept to the best-reply dynamics see Hofbauer
(1995), Cressman (2003), and Hofbauer and Sorin (2006).
For Game 13 (see also Figure 7) the global attractor of the best reply dynamics (1) consists
of all Nash equilibria and the line segment from (U, 1
2(L+R)) to (D,R) which is the connecting
orbit between the component and the strict Nash equilibrium. This is also the global attractor
of both (1) and (2) for the larger Game 9. However, for Game 13 and the reﬁned best reply
dynamics (2) the global attractor consists of the strict equilibrium (D,R) only.
Theorem 4 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Then the global attractor of (2) is contained in the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies σ∞(Θ).
Proof: Let A be the global attractor of (2). As in the previous proof we show by induction on k:
If si ∈ Si \ Rk
i , and x ∈ A then xisi = 0. Indeed, this follows since (3) must hold for all t ∈ IR,
and xisi(t) would be unbounded for t → −∞ otherwise. Hence A ⊂ σ∞(Θ). QED
Theorem 5 Let Γ ∈ G∗ and R a σ-CURB set. Then Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under (2).
Proof: By the deﬁnition of σ and a σ-CURB set we have that for any x ∈ U where U is a
suﬃciently small neighborhood of Θ(R) it is true that for any i ∈ I si ∈ Si(x) implies si ∈ Ri.
Hence, for any x ∈ U we must have that ˙ xisi = −xisi for all i ∈ I and si  ∈ Ri. But then we
must have that ||x(t) − Θ(R)||∞ shrinks exponentially to zero for all x(0) ∈ U. QED
Theorem 5 has important consequences. It provides us with the main theorem of this paper.
Consider a diﬀerential inclusion ˙ x ∈ τ(x)−x, where τ : Θ ⇒ Θ is a correspondence which satisﬁes
properties 1 (product structure), 3 (non-empty valued), 4 (convex valued), and 5 (upper hemi-
continuous) and property 2 is replaced by τi(x) ∩ βi(x)  = ∅ ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I (i.e. τ(x) includes
at least one best reply to x). Then analogous to Theorem 5 we have that every τ-CURB set
(deﬁned analogously to a σ-CURB set) is asymptotically stable under its induced diﬀerential
inclusion ˙ x ∈ τ(x)−x. In addition, for every correspondence τ′ satisfying the same 5 properties
and, in addition, τ′(x) ⊂ τ(x) for all x ∈ Θ (i.e. τ′ is a reﬁnement of τ) we have that every
τ-CURB set is also a τ′-CURB set. Thus every τ-CURB set is also asymptotically stable under
the diﬀerential inclusion ˙ x ∈ τ′(x)−x. However, for every correspondence τ satisfying the above
5 properties we have that σ(x) ⊂ τ(x) for all x ∈ Θ by the minimality of σ among reﬁned best-
reply correspondences and by the property of τ that τi(x) ∩ βi(x)  = ∅ ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I, which
σ also satisﬁes. Thus every face that is asymptotically stable under some diﬀerential inclusion
˙ x ∈ τ(x) − x, where τ satisﬁes the 5 properties above, is also asymptotically stable under the
minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence. We thus have the following main theorem.
Theorem 6 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let τ : Θ ⇒ Θ be a correspondence which satisﬁes properties 1
(product structure), 3 (non-empty valued), 4 (convex valued), and 5 (upper hemi-continuous)
24and property 2 is replaced by τi(x) ∩ βi(x)  = ∅ ∀ x ∈ Θ, ∀ i ∈ I (i.e. τ(x) includes at least one
best reply to x). Then every asymptotically stable face under the induced diﬀerential inclusion
˙ x ∈ τ(x)−x is also asymptotically stable under the minimal reﬁned best-response dynamics (2).
A corollary of Theorem 5, combined with Theorem 2, is that Kalai and Samet’s (1984) absorbing
retracts are asymptotically stable under the reﬁned best-reply dynamics (2).
Corollary 4 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let R be a strategy selection such that Θ(R) is an absorbing retract.
Then Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under (2).
It is not true that the reﬁned best-reply dynamics necessarily converges to a persistent retract.
A simple example is a coordination game where there are some solutions that end up in the
completely mixed equilibrium. Worse, in Game 5, the non-persistent equilibrium (B,D,E)
attracts an open set of initial values.
In some games there are sets which are proper subsets of persistent retracts which are asymp-
totically stable. A simple example is the matching pennies game where the unique equilibrium
is asymptotically stable, in fact the global attractor. (This holds for any two–person zero–sum
game with a unique interior equilibrium, see Brown (1951) and Hofbauer and Sorin (2006).)
Another example is Game 8. Here, the unique persistent retract is the set of σ-rationalizable
strategies σ∞(Θ) = ∆({A,B}) × ∆({D,E}). The subset A = {x ∈ σ∞(Θ)|x1Bx2E = 0}, which
is not a retract, is also asymptotically stable, being the global attractor. Note also that the re-
ﬁned best-response correspondence of this game constrained to the set ∆({A,B}) × ∆({D,E})





                                                                                  
Game 14: A game in which the global at-
tractor is much smaller than the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies.
Figure 8: Best response dynamics of Game 14,
ignoring the strictly dominated strategy M.
In Game 14, the global attractor is even contained in a proper subface of the set of σ-
rationalizable strategies. In this game, M is strictly dominated. The correspondences σ and
β coincide. The set of (σ–)rationalizable strategies equals ∆({U,D}) × ∆({L,R}). The game
restricted to this face is a ’chain store’ game as in Cressman (2003). The global attractor equals
the set of ﬁxed points of σ (which equals the set of Nash equilibria), {D} × ∆({1
2(L + R),R}).
Most orbits converge to (D,R), see Figure 8. Note that only part of the face {D}×∆({L,R}) is
invariant under (2). Starting in (D,L) leads ﬁrst into the face ∆({U,D}) × ∆({L,R}) and only
in the limit to (D,R).
25A subset of Θ which is spanned by a strategy selection R, however, if it is asymptotically
stable under (2), then R must be a σ-CURB set and, hence, Θ(R) an absorbing retract.
Theorem 7 Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let R be a strategy selection such that Θ(R) is asymptotically stable
under (2). Then R is a σ-CURB set, and, hence, Θ(R) is an absorbing retract.
Proof: Let Γ ∈ G∗. Let R be a strategy selection such that Θ(R) is asymptotically stable under
(2). Suppose R is not a σ-CURB set. Then there is an x ∈ Θ(R) and a player i ∈ I such that
there is a si ∈ Si(x)\Ri. By the deﬁnition of Si this implies that si ∈ Bi(y) for all y in an open
set U ⊂ Θ containing x. By the deﬁnition of G∗ there then must be an open subset U′ of U such
that Bi(y) is a singleton for all y ∈ U′, and, hence, Bi(y) = {si}. But then for every solution
y( ) to (2) starting at any y ∈ U′ we must have that ˙ yi,si(t) = 1 − yi,si(t), which must be close
to 1. Hence, for all initial states y ∈ U′ yi,si(t) initially grows exponentially, and, hence, Θ(R)
is not asymptotically stable under (2), providing a contradiction. QED
Theorem 7 implies that a minimal asymptotically stable face of Θ must be a persistent retract
or minimal σ-CURB set. One cannot replace face with closed and convex set in this statement.
A simple example is again the matching pennies game.
A corollary to Theorems 5 and 7 is the following.
Corollary 5 Let Γ ∈ G∗. A state x ∈ Θ is asymptotically stable under (2) if and only if it is a
robust equilibrium point (Okada (1983)).
This follows from the fact that a robust equilibrium point is a singleton persistent retract. Note
that in games in G∗ a robust equilibrium point must be a pure strategy proﬁle.
10 Index theory
The simplest deﬁnition of the index of an isolated Nash equilibrium or a component of Nash
equilibria C is via the best reply correspondence: i(C) is deﬁned as the Lefschetz ﬁxed point
index of C under the best reply correspondence. Earlier deﬁnitions use the replicator dynamics
and Brouwer degree, as in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) (chapter 13.2-4) or in Ritzberger (2002)
(section 6.5), which leads to an explicit formula for regular equilibria in terms of the sign of a
certain determinant.
For a correspondence F : Θ → Θ satisfying properties 3-5 from section 3 and an open
subset U ⊂ Θ such that ∂U contains no ﬁxed points of F, the Lefschetz ﬁxed point index
Λ(F,U) is deﬁned and satisﬁes a number of properties, in particular the ﬁve axioms in section
4 of McLennan (1989). If C is a component of Nash equilibria then deﬁne the index of C as
i(C) = Λ(β,U) where U is an open neighborhood of C such that C = {x ∈ ¯ U : x ∈ β(x)}, i.e.,
all Nash equilibria in the closure of U are in C. The additivity axiom shows that this deﬁnition
does not depend on the choice of U. We then deﬁne the σ–index of C as iσ(C) = Λ(σ,U)
where C is a closed set (e.g., a component of ﬁxed points of σ, a component of Nash equilibria,
or a persistent retract) and U an open neighborhood of C such that C = {x ∈ ¯ U : x ∈ σ(x)}.
The continuity axiom (Axiom 2 in section 4 of McLennan (1989)) implies that i(C) = iσ(C)
holds for every component C of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 18 Every Nash equilibrium component with nonzero index contains a ﬁxed point
of σ.
26Proof: Let C be a Nash equilibrium component. Then i(C) = iσ(C) = iσ({x ∈ C : σ(x) = x}.
Hence, if i(C)  = 0, C contains a ﬁxed point of σ. QED
Theorem 8 Every Nash equilibrium component C contains ﬁnitely many components Ci of σ
ﬁxed points. Furthermore, i(C) =
P
iσ(Ci).
Proof: For two person games the ﬁrst statement follows from Corollary 1. For more players
we need the following lemma which generalizes a corresponding statement about the set of
Nash equilibria in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). The second statement follows then from the
additivity axiom. QED
Lemma 8 For every game in G∗ the set of ﬁxed points of σ is a semi–algebraic set and therefore
has only ﬁnitely many components.
Proof: We use the Tarski-Seidenberg principle and some of its consequences, as outlined in
Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1998), to show that the set of ﬁxed points of σ is semi-algebraic and
hence the result follows from Theorem 2.4.5 in Bochnak, Coste, and Roy (1998). We notice ﬁrst
that the set Ψ(si) consisting of all x ∈ Θ for which a pure strategy si ∈ Si, i ∈ I, is a unique
best reply is an open semi-algebraic set because it consists of all x ∈ Θ for which the inequality
ui (si,x−i) > ui (ti,x−i) holds for all ti  = si. The closure of this set ¯ Ψi (si) is the set where si is
a semi-robust best reply. It is a semi-algebraic set by Proposition 2.2.2 in Bochnak, Coste, and
Roy (1998). For every si ∈ Si, i ∈ I, we conclude that the set of all x ∈ Θ for which xisi = 0
or x ∈ ¯ Ψi (si) is semi-algebraic because it is a union of semi-algebraic sets. The intersection of
all these sets over varying i ∈ I and si ∈ Si, which is the set of ﬁxed points of σ, is hence also
semi-algebraic. QED
D E F
A 1,2 1,0 1,0
B 1,0 1,2 0,0
C 0,2 1,2 2,0
D E F
A 1,1 0,-1 -1,1
B -1,0 0,0 -1,0
C 1,-1 0,-1 -2,-2
Game 15: A game with a unique component
of Nash equilibria, which ”breaks up” into two
(much smaller) subcomponents of ﬁxed points
of σ.
Game 16: A game from Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986).
Game 15 provides an example of a Nash equilibrium component C that contains more than
one component of σ ﬁxed points. In this game there is a single closed connected component
of Nash equilibria. It is the union of two line segments, ∆(A, A+B
2 ) × D and A+B
2 × ∆(D,E),
and the triangle ∆(A+B
2 ,B,C)×E. Note that strategy F is strictly dominated and B is weakly
dominated. There are only two ﬁxed points of σ. These are (A,D) (which is asymptotically
stable under (2) and therefore has σ–index 1) and (C,E) (with σ–index 0). The global attractor
for (2) consists of these two equilibria and a connecting orbit.
Proposition 19 Every σ-CURB set has σ-index 1.
27Proposition 20 If a component C of ﬁxed points of σ is asymptotically stable under the reﬁned
best reply dynamics (2) then iσ(C) = χ(C).
This is a multi-valued version of Theorem 1 of Demichelis and Ritzberger (2003). It follows from
a more general result of DeMichelis and Sorin (personal communication).
Consider now Game 16, an example from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) (p. 1034), see also
Demichelis and Ritzberger (2003) (Example 3, p. 71). In this symmetric game, the second
and the third strategy are weakly dominated. Hence AD is the unique perfect equilibrium
and the unique ﬁxed point of σ. The game has a unique NE component. It is a hexagon
spanned by the sequence of pure Nash equilibria AD–AF–BF–BE–CE–CD–AD. Hence its Euler
characteristic is 0, but its index is 1. Hence it is not asymptotically stable by Theorem 1
of Demichelis and Ritzberger (2003). From an evolutionary perspective this game presents a
puzzle: There is a unique component of equilibria, yet it cannot be asymptotically stable. In
this game every asymptotically stable set under any reasonable dynamics must contain non-
equilibrium strategies.11 However, AD is the only σ–rationalizable strategy, and therefore, by
Theorem 4, AD is the global attractor under the reﬁned best–reply dynamics (2). Thus, the
reﬁned best-reply dynamics resolves the above puzzle.
Finally, we conjecture that every σ-CURB set, and more generally, every set with nonzero
σ–index contains a strategically stable set in the sense of Mertens.
11 Conclusion
In this paper we endeavored to ﬁnd the smallest sets (corresponding to strategy selections)
of strategy proﬁles that can be justiﬁably called evolutionarily stable. To be more precise we
characterize the, in a well-speciﬁed sense, smallest set of strategy proﬁles which is asymptotically
stable under a deterministic evolutionary process. In order to do so we introduce reﬁnements
of the best-reply correspondence which satisfy 5, we believe reasonable, criteria. We believe a
player might reasonably restrict attention to choosing best-replies from this reﬁned set. The
criteria are as follows. A reﬁned best-reply correspondence must have a product structure,
as we want players to choose independently. It must be a point-wise subset of the best-reply
correspondence, as we want players to only choose best responses. It must be non-empty-
valued, thereby not allowing a player to not choose at all. It must be point-wise closed and
convex. Closedness is more of a technical requirement, but convexity derives from the desire
to have players randomize arbitrarily between their reﬁned best-responses. Finally we require a
reﬁned best-reply correspondence to be upper-hemi continuous. This is an important technical
requirement as it guarantees that such a reﬁned best-reply correspondence has a ﬁxed point and
the diﬀerential inclusion based on it, i.e., the reﬁned best-reply dynamics, always has a solution.
In terms of player behavior it translates to the requirement that if one were to perturb the
current strategy proﬁle of the opponents a little bit this player will not choose a new strategy
which was not formerly in the set of reﬁned best-replies.
The existence of a reﬁned best-reply correspondence immediately follows from the observa-
tion that the usual best-reply correspondence does satisfy all 5 criteria and hence is also a reﬁned
best-reply correspondence. A game could then in principle have many such reﬁned best-reply
11In many dynamics, e.g. (1), the global attractor in this game contains besides the Nash equilibria a continuum
of orbits connecting the nonperfect equilibria to the perfect one, AD. This forms a two dimensional surface spanned
by the hexagon. This ﬁlled-in hexagon has Euler characteristic 1.
28correspondences, in fact it could even have (inﬁnitely) many minimal such reﬁned best-reply
correspondences. Under mild conditions, which are satisﬁed, for instance, when no player has
any two equivalent strategies, then this game has a unique minimal reﬁned best-reply correspon-
dence. For these games we then studied this minimal reﬁned best-reply correspondence and the
reﬁned best-reply dynamics based on it.
While there are many results in the paper, characterizing ﬁxed points of this correspon-
dence as well as a notion of rationalizability based on it among other things, the main result, to
our minds, is that the smallest asymptotically stable faces under any diﬀerential inclusion with
reasonable properties are those which are asymptotically stable based on the minimal reﬁned
best-reply correspondence (Theorem 6) and these are Kalai and Samet’s (1984) persistent re-
tracts, which in turn are CURB sets (Basu and Weibull (1991)) based on the reﬁned best-reply
correspondence (Theorems 2 and 5). This reinforces Hurkens’s (1995) ﬁnding that a stochas-
tic best-reply learning process based on semi-robust best-replies also leads to play eventually
leading to a persistent retract. Altogether this suggest that while it is diﬃcult to justify Nash
equilibrium behavior, either epistemically or through evolution or learning, yet alone any of
its point-wise reﬁnements or even set-wise reﬁnements such as Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986)
strategically stable sets, there are sets of strategy proﬁles which are justiﬁable through learning
and the smallest such sets (if we restrict attention to faces) are Kalai and Samet’s (1984) per-
sistent retracts, which in turn are CURB sets (Basu and Weibull (1991)) based on the reﬁned
best-reply correspondence. Hence, we suggest that in applied game theory work CURB sets and
persistent retracts, which are as of now not used to a great extent, may be very apt choices for
a solution concept.
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32A On the generic equivalence of own-payoﬀ equivalence and
payoﬀ equivalence
The condition that own-payoﬀ equivalence implies payoﬀ equivalence for pure strategies is closely
related to the Single Payoﬀ Condition (SPC) of Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2007) for
perfect information games and it seems apt to use the same name here. This appendix spells
out a simple condition under which SPC holds generically in a given class of games. We then
provide a series of examples to illustrate, using this result, that the restriction to games satisfying
SPC and hence, after the identiﬁcation of payoﬀ equivalent strategies, to games in G∗, is not a
severe one.
Deﬁnition 2 A normal form game satisﬁes the Single Payoﬀ Condition (SPC) if the following
holds for all players i ∈ I. Two strategies si,s′
i ∈ Si satisfy the equations





for all s−i ∈ S−i only if also the equations





holds for all j ∈ I and all s−i ∈ S−i.
Deﬁnition 3 For a given set of strategy combinations S consider a family of normal form games
{Γ } ∈O given by utility functions
ui (s, ) (4)
for s ∈ S and i ∈ I, which depend on a vector of parameters   taken from a nonempty open set
O in some Euclidian space IRk. We call the family analytic if all ui (s, ) are analytic functions
in   for given s ∈ S.12 We say that the family satisﬁes the Functional Single Payoﬀ Condition if
the following holds for all players i ∈ I. Two strategies si,s′
i ∈ Si satisfy the functional identities





for all   ∈ O
for all s−i ∈ S−i only if also the functional identities





for all   ∈ O
hold for all j ∈ I and all s−i ∈ S−i.
Proposition 21 Suppose the analytic family of games {Γ } ∈O satisﬁes the Functional Single
Payoﬀ Condition. Then for generic   ∈ O the game Γ  satisﬁes the Single Payoﬀ Condition.
Proof: Fix i ∈ I, si,s′
i ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I such that uj (si,s−i, ) and uj (s′
i,s−i, )
are distinct as functions in  . Then the set of parameter values   for which






12An analytic function is a function that is locally described by power series. The notion covers most functions
arising in applications, in particular linear and rational functions or functions like e
x or ln(x). In our examples
the functions are always linear.
33is a closed lower dimensional analytic set because the function is analytic (see e.g., Gunning and
Rossi (1965)). Because there are ﬁnitely many choices of i ∈ I, si,s′
i ∈ Si s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I
to consider we ﬁnd that for   outside a lower dimensional analytic subset D of O the identity
(5) for some i ∈ I, si,s′
i ∈ Si s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I implies the identity (5) for all i ∈ I, si,s′
i ∈ Si
s−i ∈ S−i and j ∈ I and also   ∈ O. In particular, the SPC condition holds for all   / ∈ D.QED
Example 1 In a cheap talk game players ﬁrst send simultaneously and independently public
messages mi from message spaces Mi. After all players have received the combination of messages
m = (m1,    ,mn) ∈ M = ×i∈IMi (6)
they choose simultaneously and independently actions ai ∈ Ai. A pure strategy in such a game
consists of a message mi and a function fi : M → Ai. The play of any strategy combination s
will result in a combination of messages m ∈ M and a combination of actions
a = (a1,    ,an) ∈ A = ×i∈IAi, (7)
where, in a cheap talk game, only the latter is payoﬀ relevant. In this example the parameter
space is IRA×I. For   ∈ IRA×I we deﬁne the utility function by
ui (s, ) =  a,i (8)
where a is the combination of actions induced by s. The utility function is then for each s ∈ S
the projection onto a particular component of the vector  . The identity






can only hold for all   if both functions project onto the same component of  , i.e., if the
play of both (si,s−i) and (s′
i,s−i) results in the same combination of actions a, although in
possibly diﬀerent combinations of messages. (If (si,s−i) and (s′
i,s−i) would result in diﬀerent
combinations of actions a and a′ the equality would not hold in the game where all players get
1 after a and 0 after a′.) If this is the case then, by construction,






for all j and  . Thus Proposition 21 applies and we conclude that the SPC holds generically in
cheap talk games.
Example 2 In an extensive game without chance moves the play of any pure strategy
combination results in a terminal node t ∈ T. In this case the parameter space for a given
extensive form is IRT×I and the utility function is ui (s, ) =  t,i if s induces t. The same
arguments as for cheap talk games imply that the SPC holds in generic extensive form games
with no random moves. Notice, though, that almost no extensive game with the extensive form
of a cheap talk game is itself a cheap talk game. Hence the previous result is not a special case
of this one.
34Example 3 In an extensive game with chance moves the parameter space remains as in the
previous example, but the utility function becomes




where pt is the probability with which terminal node t is reached when the pure strategy com-
bination s is played. Clearly, the equation













can only hold for all   ∈ RT×I if pt = p′
t for all t ∈ T. Thus the SPC holds for generic extensive
form games even with chance moves.
Example 4 In a ﬁnitely repeated game with perfect monitoring, no discounting and t ≥ 0
periods, the play of a pure strategy combination s results in a sequence (a1,a2,    ,at) of com-




where the parameter  a,i is player i’s payoﬀ in the stage game from the combination of actions
a and ks,a is the number of times a is played in the sequence (a1,a2,    ,at). If for two strategy
combinations s = (si,s−i) and s′ = (s′
i,s−i)











holds for all   ∈ RA×I then ks,a = ks′,a for all a ∈ A and, hence,











Again, the SPC holds generically in repeated games.
Example 5 Consider ﬁnally the class of normal form games which satisfy for every i ∈ I, every
s−i ∈ S−i and any si s′
i ∈ Si the equation






If at least one player has two strategies, then this class does not satisfy the Functional Single
Payoﬀ Condition. Almost all games in this class violate the SPC.
B On the generic equivalence of best responses and semi-robust
best responses
This section provides a proof of Proposition 3. Note ﬁrst that generic normal form games are
in the class G∗ where all semi-robust responses are pure strategies. The proof of Proposition
353 is organized in a number of steps: We will ﬁrst ﬁx some notations for the mappings and
various submanifolds to be considered. Step 1 argues that the embedding of the uncorrelated
strategy combinations into the set of beliefs has nice diﬀerentiability properties. Step 2 invokes
the transversality theorem (see Guillemin and Pollack (1974)) to show that for generic payoﬀ
functions we obtain the needed transversality conditions.13 Step 3 argues that we can restrict
attention to completely mixed strategy combinations of the opponents. If the player is indiﬀerent
between several of his strategies against a given completely mixed strategy combination, step
4 shows how we can construct an arbitrarily nearby strategy combination, against which the
player strictly prefers a given one among these strategies. Step 5 completes the argument.
For any ﬁnite set M let IRM be the vector space of all mappings y : M → IR. The dimension
of IRM is the number of elements in M.
Let qi :
Q





qi describes the ﬁrst step in the computation mentioned above.
While x−i denotes the usual strategy combination of the opponents, we deﬁne χ−i to describe
a “correlated strategy of the opponents”, i.e. a belief over S−i.
Let Li be the vector space of all linear mappings
vi : IRS−i → IRSi.
If χ−i ∈ IRS−i is a belief and si ∈ Si a pure strategy of player i, then (vi (χ−i))(si) is the
expected payoﬀ for player i. vi describes for every si the second step in the computation of the
expected payoﬀ. Any vi ∈ Li corresponds uniquely to a payoﬀ function
ui : S → IR
in the standard notation (and this relation is a homeomorphism).
For Ti ⊆ Si set Zi (Ti) = {z ∈ IRSi | ∀si,ti ∈ Ti : z (si) = z (ti)}. Let Xj := {xj ∈ IRSj | P
sj∈Sj xj (sj) = 1} for j  = i and X−i :=
Q
j =i Xj.
For Tj ⊆ Sj (j  = i) and T−i :=
Q
j =i Tj set






The sets Θ−i ∩ X−i (T−i) describe the various faces of the polyhedron Θ−i.
Step 1: For all T−i the mapping qi : X−i (T−i) → IRS−i \{0} is a diﬀeomorphism onto its image
(in particular qi (X−i (T−i)) is a closed submanifold of IRS−i \ {0}).
13This transversality theorem is a straightforward consequence of Sard’s theorem. If one assumes an algebraic
map and uses in its proof in Guillemin and Pollack (1974) the algebraic version of Sard’s theorem in Bochnak,
Coste, and Roy (1998) one obtains a stronger version of the transversality theorem where the conclusion of the
theorem holds outside a lower dimensional semi-algebraic set.






. It is straightforward to
check that
qi|X−i(T−i) : X−i (T−i) → IRS−i \ {0}
is well deﬁned, is one-to-one, maps X−i (T−i) to a closed set, and has a derivative dqi|x−i with
maximal rank everywhere.14
Step 2: Let Z ⊆ IRSi and X ⊆ IRS−i \ {0} be submanifolds. Then for almost every vi ∈ Li the
mapping vi|X : X → IRS−i \ {0} is transversal to Z.
Proof: The family of linear maps Li deﬁnes a mapping
Vi : Li × IRS−i → IRSi (17)
(vi,χ−i)  → vi (χ−i) . (18)
The derivative of Vi at (vi,χ−i) can be computed as
dVi|(vi,χ−i) : TviLi × Tχ−iIRS−i ∼ = Li × IRS−i → IRSi (19)
(νi,ξ−i)  → νi (χ−i) + vi (ξ−i). (20)
If χ−i  = 0 we can ﬁnd for every ζi ∈ IRSi some νi ∈ Li with νi (χ−i) = ζi. Then
dVi|(vi,χ−i) (νi,0) = ζi.
Because for χ−i ∈ X the tangent space Tχ−iX ⊆ IRS−i contains the 0-vector, dVi|(vi,χ−i) :
TviLi × Tχ−iX → IRSi is surjective. Thus Vi : Li × X → IRSi is transversal to Z and our claim
follows from the transversality theorem.
By step 1 and step 2 almost every vi ∈ Li satisﬁes:
⊗
For all subsets Ti ⊆ Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n) the mapping (vi ◦ qi)|X−i(T−i) is
transversal to Zi (Ti).
For given vi deﬁne Y (Ti) = {x−i ∈ X−i | (vi ◦ qi)(x−i) ∈ Z (Ti)}. Y (Ti) ∩ Θ−i is the set of
strategy combinations of the opponents such that player i is indiﬀerent between the strategies
in Ti (i.e. they give the same payoﬀ).
Step 3: Suppose vi satisﬁes ⊗. For Ti ⊆ Si let x−i ∈ Y (Ti)∩Θ−i and let O−i be a neighborhood
of x−i. Then O−i ∩ Y (Ti) contains a point in the interior of Θ−i.
Proof: Suppose x−i is in the boundary of Θ−i. For each j  = i deﬁne Tj := {sj ∈ Sj | xj (sj) = 0}.
If Tj = ∅, xj is in the relative interior of Θj. By assumption Tj is not empty for at least one
opponent j. Fix j∗  = i with Tj∗  = ∅ and tj∗ ∈ Tj∗. Set ˜ Tj := Tj for i  = j  = j∗ and





˜ Tj = {sj ∈ Sj | yj (sj) = 0} for all j  = i. In other words: y−i is in the relative interior of the




. The claim then follows by induction.
14The result is well known e.g. in algebraic geometry: qi deﬁnes the so-called Segre-embedding. The result
is needed in algebraic geometry to show that the product of projective spaces can itself be embedded into a
projective space, i.e. is projective-algebraic.








. (See Guillemin and Pollak [1974, exercise 2.3.7.]) Since








∩Y (Ti)∩{y−i | yj∗ (tj∗) >





Step 4: Suppose vi satisﬁes ⊗. For Ti ⊆ Si with #Ti ≥ 2 let x−i ∈ Y (Ti) be in the interior of Θ−i
and let O−i be a neighborhood of x−i. Then we can ﬁnd for every si ∈ Ti some y−i ∈ O−i ∩Θ−i
such that
(vi ◦ qi)(y−i)(si) > (vi ◦ qi)(y−i)(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti \ {si}.
Proof: Because vi ◦ qi : X−i → IRSi is transversal to both Z (Ti) and Z (Ti \ {si}) it follows
that vi ◦ qi : Y (Ti \ {si}) → Z (Ti \ {si}) is transversal to Z (Ti). From this we can deduce the
existence of a tangent vector ξ ∈ Tx−i (Y (Ti \ {si})) with dλ|x−i (ξ) = 1, where λ is the function
λ : Yi (Ti \ {si}) ∩ X−i → IR (21)
y−i → (vi ◦ qi)(y−i)(si) − (vi ◦ qi)(y−i)(ti) (22)
deﬁned for arbitrary but ﬁxed ti ∈ Ti \ {si}. We can therefore select a diﬀerentiable curve
c : (−ǫ,ǫ) → Yi (Ti \ {si})
with c(0) = x−i and (λ ◦ c)
′ (0) = 1. For suﬃciently small 0 < γ < ǫ y−i := c(γ) has the
required properties.
Step 5: Suppose si is a pure best response against x−i. For every neighborhood O−i of x−i
the continuity of the payoﬀ function and the two steps above can be used to ﬁnd y−i ∈ O−i
such that si ∈ Ti is the unique best response against y−i. Shrinking the open sets we can ﬁnd a
sequence of such y−i’s converging to x−i. Continuity yields an open set around each element in
the sequence, where si is the unique best response. si is the unique best response on the union
of these sets, which is again open. Thus si is a semi-robust best response against x−i. QED
C Reﬁned best replies in two-player games
We will restrict attention to the best replies of player 1. Suppose player 2 has K ≥ 2 strategies
s1
2,    ,sK














2 ≤ 0. Notice that the zero vector
corresponds to pure strategy sK
2 .
We deﬁne the function f : IRK−1 → IR by
f (x2) =
￿
maxs1∈S1 u1 (s1,x2) for x2 ∈ Θ2
+∞ else
(24)
38Because u1 is linear in x2, f is, in the terminology of Rockafellar (1970) a proper convex
polyhedral function. Each strategy x1 ∈ Θ1 deﬁnes an aﬃne function a : IRK−1 → IR
by a(x2) = u1 (x1,x2), which, for all x2 ∈ Θ2, satisﬁes the inequality a(x2) ≤ f (x2) and
a(x2) = f (x2) holds if and only if x1 ∈ β1 (x2).
For a strategy x1 ∈ Θ1 we deﬁne the set
G(x1) = {(x2,α) ∈ Θ2 × IR | x1 ∈ β (x2) and α = u1 (x1,x2)} (25)
and the set H (x1) = {x2 ∈ Θ2 | x1 ∈ β (x2)}, the projection of G(x1) onto Θ2. H (x1) is the
region where x1 is a best reply. x1 is robust if H (x1) has non-empty interior H◦ (x1). We can
now describe the epigraph
F =
￿
(x2,α) ∈ IRK−1 × IR | f (x2) ≤ α
￿
(26)
of f as follows: F is a polyhedral convex set whose compact faces are precisely the sets G(x1)
with x1 ∈ Θ1. The non-compact faces are of the form F ∩ (Θ′
1 × IR), where Θ′
1 is a face of Θ1.
Because H (x1) is a convex polyhedron the closure of H◦ (x1) is H (x1) if H◦ (x1) is non-
empty. Using lemma 2 this implies immediately Proposition 4.






2 • x2 − f (x2)} = max
x2∈Θ2
{x∗
2 • x2 − f (x2)} < ∞, (27)
where x∗




2. As shown for any convex polyhedral
function in Rockafellar (1970), the conjugate is again a convex polyhedral function and one has
f∗∗ (x2) = f (x2).
Any two strategies x1,x′
1 ∈ Θ1 deﬁne the same aﬃne function if and only if the two strategies




2 ∈ IRK−1 and α ∈ IR deﬁnes one and only one aﬃne function on
IRK−1 by






We will identify aﬃne functions with such vectors. For instance, e = (1,...,1) corresponds to
the function −xK+
2 = −1 +
PK−1
k=1 xk
2 which assigns 0 to the ﬁrst K − 1 pure strategies and −1
to the last pure strategy of player 2.
Let F∗ be the epigraph of f∗.
Lemma 9 F∗ is a polyhedral convex set generated by extreme points x1 which are robust best







∈ IRK with el
k =
￿
−1 for k = l
0 else
(29)
for k = 1,...,K − 1 and
e = (1,...,1) ∈ IRK (30)
39Proof: By deﬁnition (x∗
2,α∗) ∈ F∗ if and only if α∗ ≥ x∗
2 • x2 − f∗ (x2) for all x2 ∈ Θ2. v ∈ IRK
is a direction in F∗ if and only if there exists (x∗
2,α∗) ∈ F∗ such that all vectors (x∗
2,α∗) + λv
with λ ≥ 0 are in F∗. We can write v = −
PK−1
k=1 ρkek + ρKe with ρ1,...,ρK ∈ IR since
−e1,...,−eK−1,e form a vector basis of IRK. We must show that v is a direction in F∗ if and
only if all ρi are non-negative. Suppose that v is a direction in F∗. Let x2 = (0,...,0) ∈ Θ2.
The condition that (x∗
2,α∗) + λv ∈ F∗ for all λ ≥ 0 yields for this x2 that α∗ + λρK ≥ −f (x2)
holds for all λ ≥ 0. This can be true only if ρK ≥ 0. For ek ∈ Θ2 (1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1) we obtain
similarly α∗+λρK ≥ x∗k
2 −λρk +λρK −f (ek) for all λ ≥ 0, which can hold only if ρk ≥ 0. Thus
only positive combinations of −e1,...,−eK−1,e can be directions in F∗. For every combination
v = −
PK−1
k=1 ρkek+ρKe with ρ1,...,ρK ≥ 0, every λ ≥ 0, every (x∗
2,α∗) ∈ F∗ and every x2 ∈ Θ2
we have conversely





2 + λρK − f (x2) (31)
which proves that v is a direction in F∗.
We have characterized the directions of F∗ and must now determine the extremal points
of F∗. Suppose (ˆ x∗
2, ˆ α∗) is an extremal point. Because F∗ has only ﬁnitely many extremal
points, these are exposed points by Straszewick’s theorem (Theorem 18.6 in Rockafellar (1970)).
Therefore we can ﬁnd x2 ∈ Θ2 such that the hyperplane {x∗
2 • x2 = f (x2)} is a supporting
hyperplane which meets F∗ only in (ˆ x∗
2,f∗ (ˆ x∗
2)). Because F∗ has only ﬁnitely many extreme
points and directions there exists an open neighborhood U of x2 in Θ2 for which the hyper-
planes {x∗
2 • y2 = f (y2)} are for all y2 ∈ U supporting hyperplanes which intersect F∗ only in
(ˆ x∗
2,f∗ (ˆ x∗
2)). This implies that the graph of the aﬃne function (ˆ x∗
2,f∗ (ˆ x∗
2)) intersects F in a
K − 1 dimensional face. It is therefore identical to a aﬃne function deﬁned by a strategy x1 in
Θ1 for which H (x1) is full dimensional. Given our identiﬁcation, (ˆ x∗
2,f∗ (ˆ x∗
2)) is consequently a
robust strategy in Θ1, which was to be shown. QED
The lemma implies that all extreme points and hence all the points in the compact faces of F∗
are in Θ1.
However, no points on the compact faces of F∗ apart from the extreme points are robust
strategies. To see this, notice that a proper mixture x1 =
PL
l=1 ρlx1k (L > 2,ρl > 0,
PL
l=1 ρl = 1)
of non-equivalent robust strategies in Θ1 is not robust. Otherwise there would be an open set in
Θ2 on which x1 and hence all strategies x1k were best replies. They would yield identical payoﬀs
on an open set and were hence (by Lemma 1) all equivalent, contradicting the assumption.
Finally, consider a strategy in Θ1 which is not on a compact face of F∗. It can be written
as x′
1 = x1 −
PK
k=1 ρkek +ρKe where x1 is on one of the compact faces of F∗ and, hence, in Θ1,


















≤ u1 (x1,x2), (32)
where this inequality holds as a strict one for the k-th pure strategy of player 2 whenever ρk > 0.
Thus x′
1 is weakly dominated. It is not a robust strategy because it is a best reply only on a
proper face of Θ1 (see Pearce (1984)).
In summary, the only robust strategies in Θ1 are the extreme point of F∗. All other strategies
are proper mixtures of non-equivalent robust strategies or are weakly dominated and therefore
not robust. In particular, we have proved Proposition 5.
40